Arbitration Half Yearly Digest 2025- Part 2
Case Title: ADAVYA PROJECTS PVT. LTD. VERSUS M/S VISHAL STRUCTURALS PVT. LTD. & ORS., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5297 OF 2025
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 439
The Supreme Court recently observed that not being served with the notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and not being made a party in the Section 11 application (for appointment of arbitrator), are not sufficient grounds to hold that a person cannot be made party to arbitral proceedings.
“A notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the ACA is mandatory…and it is a prerequisite to filing an application under Section 11. However, merely because such a notice was not issued to certain persons who are parties to the arbitration agreement does not denude the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction to implead them as parties during the arbitral proceedings…merely because a court does not refer a certain party to arbitration in its order does not denude the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal from impleading them during the arbitral proceedings as the referral court’s view does not finally determine this issue. The relevant consideration to determine whether a person can be made a party before the arbitral tribunal is if such a person is a party to the arbitration agreement“, said a bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra.
Case Title: LARSEN AND TOUBRO LTD. VERSUS PURI CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 449
On April 21, the Supreme Court expressed its displeasure over the prolonged arguments and submissions made by members of the Bar in arbitration proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court noted that excessively long oral submissions force judges to invest significant time in reviewing extended arguments, often supported by a large volume of case law, regardless of their relevance. This practice, particularly in high-stakes matters, leads to unnecessarily lengthy judgments and ultimately undermines the efficiency and growth of arbitration as an effective dispute resolution mechanism in India.
“We have noticed that there is a tendency on the part of senior members of the bar to argue as if these proceedings were regular appeals under Section 96 of CPC. In this case, while making submissions, we learned counsels for both the parties have gone into minute and factual details…”, the bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Pankaj Mithal said.
Case Title – Electrosteel Steel Limited (Now M/S ESL Steel Limited) vs Ispat Carrier Private Limited
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491
The Supreme Court recently allowed an appeal challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) against Electrosteel Steels Ltd., holding that the award was non-executable in view of the resolution plan approved under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016.
“we have no hesitation to hold that upon approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT, the claim of the respondent being outside the purview of the resolution plan stood extinguished. Therefore, the award dated 06.07.2018 is incapable of being executed”, the Court said.
A bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan reiterated that once a resolution plan is approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 31(1) of the IBC, any claim that is not part of the plan stands extinguished and cannot be pursued further.
Case Title: CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION CONSORTIUM LIMITED VERSUS SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY PARKS OF INDIA
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 501
The Supreme Court reiterated that the courts cannot go beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) while deciding an application for setting aside of an award.
“the role of the court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is clearly demarcated. It is a restrictive jurisdiction and has to be invoked in a conservative manner. The reason is that arbitral autonomy must be respected and judicial interference should remain minimal otherwise it will defeat the very object of the 1996 Act.”, the court added. Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan upheld the Madras High Court Division Bench’s ruling, which had overturned the Single Judge’s interference with the tribunal’s decision based on a re-evaluation of the evidence.
Case Details : GAYATRI BALASAMY Versus M/S ISG NOVASOFT TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED| SLP(C) No. 15336-15337/2021
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508
Answering a reference, a Constitution Bench (by 4:1) of the Supreme Court held that Appellate Courts have limited powers to modify arbitral awards while exercising powers under either Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The majority judgment by Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna held that the Courts have a limited power under Section 34/37 to modify arbitral awards. This limited power can be exercised in the following circumstances :
1. When the award is severable by separating the invalid portion from the valid portion of the award.
2. To correct any clerical, computation or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record.
3. To modify post-award interest in some circumstances.
4. The special powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be applied to modify awards. But this power must be exercised with great caution within the limits of the Constitution.
Case Details : GAYATRI BALASAMY Versus M/S ISG NOVASOFT TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED| SLP(C) No. 15336-15337/2021
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508
The Supreme Court Constitution Bench recently held that the powers of Courts to remand arbitral awards back to the Tribunal under S. 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 cannot be seen as a straight-jacket formula.The Court observed that an award should be remitted back only if there is a possibility to correct a defect in the award, but if the entire award suffers from substantial injustice and patent illegality, remittance should be avoided.
The Constitution Bench (by 4:1) held that Appellate Courts have limited powers to modify arbitral awards while exercising powers under either Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The bench led by CJI Sanjiv Khanna, comprising Justices BR Gavai,Sanjay Kumar, AG Masih and KV Viswanathan delivered the verdict. The Court held that the power of remand under S. 34(4) of the Act is of restrictive nature for the Courts. While the remand give flexibility to the tribunals to make amends in the award.
Case Title: ASF BUILDTECH PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS SHAPOORJI PALLONJI AND COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 521
The Supreme Court today (May 2) expressed its dissatisfaction with the continued absence of explicit statutory recognition for the power of arbitral tribunals to implead or join non-signatory parties. The Court noted with concern that, despite earlier omissions in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the newly proposed Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024, which seeks to overhaul the legislation, also failed to address this critical issue.
“We urge, the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice to take a serious look at the arbitration regime that is prevailing in India and bring about necessary changes while the Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024 is still being considered.”, the court added.
The bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan was hearing the case, which involved a question of whether the Appellant-ASF Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. (ABPL), a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, could be joined to the arbitral proceedings initiated by the Respondent-Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (SPCPL) based on the “Group of Companies” doctrine.
Case Details : GAYATRI BALASAMY Versus M/S ISG NOVASOFT TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED| SLP(C) No. 15336-15337/2021
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508
The Supreme Court recently held that in order to ensure efficient dispute resolution and uphold the objectives of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the Court should be allowed to modify awards when parties challenge the tribunal’s decision. The majority held that denying modification powers to the Court under S.34 and 37 would be contrary to the main purpose of arbitration, which is efficient dispute resolution. The Court noted that the cycle of litigation post-award takes years, especially in cases challenging the award under S.34 and appeals against the S.34 order. The Court stated :
“To deny courts the authority to modify an award—particularly when such a denial would impose significant hardships, escalate costs, and lead to unnecessary delays—would defeat the raison d’être of arbitration. This concern is particularly pronounced in India, where applications under Section 34 and appeals under Section 37 often take years to resolve.”
Case Title: ARABIAN EXPORTS PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 539
The Supreme Court today (May 6) observed that if the insured alleges coercion in arriving at a settlement with the insurer, then the dispute over the validity of the settlement remains arbitrable.
“Any dispute pertaining to the full and final settlement itself by necessary implication being a dispute arising out of or in relation to or under the substantive contract would not be precluded from reference to arbitration as the arbitration agreement contained in the original contract continues to be in existence even after the parties have discharged the original contract by ‘accord and satisfaction’.”, the court said.
The bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing the case where the Appellant-Insured, who was engaged in the meat processing business, had suffered loss due to flooding. The Appellant alleged that a voucher was signed with the insurer out of coercion to arrive at a settlement, however, immediately after signing of the settlement voucher, the Appellant invoked Arbitration clause.
Case Title: M/S JINDAL STEEL AND POWER LTD. & ANR. VERSUS M/S BANSAL INFRA PROJECTS PVT. LTD. & OTHERS
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 544
The Supreme Court (May 7) held that while the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) mandates minimal judicial interference, a High Court may, in exceptional cases, exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to grant interim relief, particularly where denial of such protection would result in irreparable harm.
“We are aware of the established legal principle that the Courts should refrain from interfering with the invocation of a bank guarantee except in cases of fraud of an egregious nature or in cases where allowing encashment would result in irretrievable injustice.”, the court said. The bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan refused to interfere with the High Court’s order granting interim protection from encashing the bank guarantees furnished by the Appellant for the construction of the residential units by the Respondent-Real Estate Company.
Case Title: M/S HARCHARAN DASS GUPTA VERSUS UNION OF INDIA
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 567
Reaffirming that the MSMED Act prevails over the Arbitration Act, as held in Gujarat State Civil Supplies v. Mahakali Foods, the Supreme Court set aside the Karnataka High Court’s interference with MSMED proceedings in Delhi, despite the contract naming Bengaluru as the arbitration seat.
The Court clarified that private contractual clauses cannot override the statutory mandate of the MSMED Act. Since the appellant-supplier was registered in Delhi, the Court noted that the Delhi Arbitration Centre had jurisdiction under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, regardless of the contract’s designation of Bengaluru as the seat of arbitration due to the overriding nature of the MSMED Act. The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi was hearing the case where a tender was issued by ISRO for construction work in New Delhi.
Case Title: South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. SMS Limited, SLP (C) No. 16913/2017
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 568
Delivering a significant judgment on arbitration law, the Supreme Court today deprecated the practice of arbitration clauses being deliberately phrased “ambiguously” by members of legal fraternity and urged judicial forums across the country to throw out cases involving “shoddily drafted arbitration clauses” at the threshold.
The Court said that such “malafide cases” are a “criminal wastage of judicial time” and have been allowed to go on for long. It called on the judicial forums to take stringent actions in this regard by invoking their suo motu powers.
A bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh delivered the judgment, wherein it was observed that India has made considerable strides in the field of arbitration, but challenges, chiefly in terms of poor drafting of arbitration clauses, remain. Calling for arbitration clauses to be framed with precision, the Court stated,
Case Title: M/S. INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION VERSUS NATIONAL PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION LTD.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 585
The Supreme Court held that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an Arbitral Tribunal has the power to award different rates of interest for different phases.
A bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan overturned the Delhi High Court’s ruling, which had invalidated the tribunal’s grant of interest on interest, deeming it impermissible under Section 31(7) of the Act.
The bench heard the case where the dispute originated from a 1984 contract for the Thermal Power Project in Andhra Pradesh. After the completion of work in 1987, the Appellant-Interstate Construction claimed unpaid dues from NPCC, leading to arbitration proceedings that began in 1993 and continued for nearly three decades through multiple arbitrators.
Case Title: K. MANGAYARKARASI & ANR. VERSUS N.J. SUNDARESAN & ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 597
The Supreme Court recently held that a mere allegation of fraud or misconduct does not divest an arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction to adjudicate in personam disputes stemming from contractual relationships governed by an arbitration agreement.
“The law is well settled that allegations of fraud or criminal wrongdoing or of statutory violation would not detract from the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to resolve a dispute arising out of a civil or contractual relationship on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by the arbitration agreement.”, the court observed.
The bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan made these observations while dismissing a plea challenging the referral of a trademark dispute to arbitration, reaffirming that contractual disagreements involving intellectual property rights (IPRs) can be resolved through arbitration unless they involve sovereign or public (in rem) rights.
Case Title: BANK OF INDIA VERSUS M/S SRI NANGLI RICE MILLS PVT. LTD. & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616
In a significant ruling under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 (“Act”), the Supreme Court today (May 23) held that inter-creditor disputes (between secured creditors) must be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the Act read with the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).
Unlike the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which requires a written agreement for reference, Section 11 of the Act creates a statutory mandate for arbitration, eliminating the need for any such agreement, the court said.
“Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, provides for a statutory arbitration for any dispute mentioned therein between any of the parties enumerated thereunder. There is no need for an explicit written agreement to arbitrate between such parties in order to attract Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act. The said provision creates a legal fiction as regards the existence of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding whether such agreement exists or not in actuality.”, the court added.
High Courts
Allahabad High Court
Case Title: M/s LR Print Solutions v. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt Ltd. and 2 others
Case Number: MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. – 8387 of 2024
Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. and others and Hindustan Construction Company Limited and others Vs. Union of India and others, the Allahabad High Court has reiterated that automatic stay on the operation of arbitral award is not granted merely by filing appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2016.
In Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. and others, the Apex Court has held that Section 36 does not automatically guarantee stay on the arbitral award when the application under Section 34 of the Act has been filed within time. It was also held that amended Section 36 should apply to Section 34 applications filed before the commencement of the Amendment Act. However, this position was clarified by the Apex Court in M/s Shree Vishnu Constructions. Vs. The Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Services and others, where it was held that the Section 36 will apply prospectively, i.e., the proceedings under Section 24 which have commenced after the amendment.
Andra Pradesh High Court
Case Title: M/S. Arya Rice Mill v. State Of U.P. And 6 Others 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 42 [WRIT – C No. – 41517 of 2024]
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 42
The Allahabad High Court has held that as per Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged after submission of defence and that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to adjudicate on its own jurisdiction.
The bench of Justice Siddhartha Varma and Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava held:
“Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for challenge to the jurisdictional authority of the Arbitral Tribunal. In terms of sub-section (2) thereof, a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction should be raised not later than the submission of the defence. If the excess of jurisdiction crops up during the proceedings, the objection should be made at that very time. In any case, objection on the question of jurisdiction has to be made before the arbitral tribunal itself, and the arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction”
Case Title: Lakshmi Agencies v. Aryapuram Coop Bank Ltd.
Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal 620/2016
The division bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of Justices R Raghunandan Rao and Maheswara Rao Kuncheam has observed that when proceedings are held before the Registrar under A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, such proceedings cannot be termed as arbitral proceedings. Accordingly, it was held that no provision of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 including Section 34 would be applicable to them. The appropriate remedy in such a case would be an appeal before the A.P. Cooperative Tribunal, under Section 76 of the APCS Act, 1964. The fact that Section 76 of the APCS Act, 1964 itself provides a remedy of appeal, against the order under Section 62 of the APCS Act, 1964, would make it amply clear that the order passed by the Assistant Registrar cannot be treated to be an award in arbitration proceedings. The Court referred the decision of the Apex Court in Greater Bombay Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. M/s United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd and Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1584 in this regard.
Case Title: M/s. Real Fab India Pvt.Ltd. Versus M/s. Rashtriya Ispath Nigam Limited
Case Title: CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2936 of 2024
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari has held that a second execution petition for enforcing an award is not maintainable if the first was rejected on the ground that the award had not been set aside, solely because a signed copy was not filed with the application to set it aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
Bombay High Court
Case Title: Ambit Urbanspace Versus Poddar Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited & Ors (COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.38696 OF 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 127
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that Eviction of tenants governed by the Rent Control Act cannot be sought under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), particularly when they are not parties to the Development Agreement executed between the Developer and the Landlords and are not being provided upgraded premises in the redeveloped building compared to what they currently occupy under the tenancy agreements.
The Court further added that only jurisdictional forums under the Rent Control Act have the authority to determine issues related to tenancy. It rejected the Landlords’ assertions of violations by the Tenants and held that proceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration Act should not be used as a backdoor method for eviction especially when no eviction action was taken over two decades that too on facts within the knowledge of the Landlords. The court also observed that a measure taken under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act ought not to conflict with special protective provisions in ameliorative legislation such as the Rent Act.
Case Title:Santanu Sengupta & Ors. Versus Macrotech Developers Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 132
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan the developer of Lodha World Towers in a petition filed under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) has been directed to charge the Federation Common Area Maintenance (FCAM) Charges at the rate agreed upon in the agreement executed between the parties, until the arbitral proceedings are completed.
The court observed that it is unclear how Macrotech could assert that the rate of Rs. 4.5 per square foot as contracted at the launch of the project could escalate to Rs. 9.92 per square foot, applying even the highest inflation of 10% per annum, when the FCAM Charges were made applicable only from October 2017. It further added that at the rate of 10% per annum, the escalation would come to Rs. 0.45 per annum and at that simple rate for eight years (although eight years would be completed only in October 2025) the aggregate increase would come to Rs. 3.6 per square foot, which would add up to Rs. 8.10 per square foot.
Case Title: Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund Versus Neelkanth Realty Private Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 134
The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice M.S. Karnik has held that an arbitrator is not permitted to decide the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue without first recording a finding as to whether it is a mixed question of law and fact that requires evidence to be led. It further held that if such a finding is not recorded and the issue is nonetheless decided as a preliminary issue, the award can be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) on the ground of violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law.
Case Title: Central Depositories Services (India) Limited. Vs. Ketan Lalit Shah and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 144
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices Revati Mohite Dere and Dr. Neela Gokhale has held that the arbitrator can allow the parties to withdraw their claims to initiate fresh arbitration proceedings by issuing a new notice of arbitration, provided that the legitimate interests of the other party are not prejudiced.
The court noted that the Delhi High Court in IDFC First Bank Limited v. Hitachi MGRM Net Limited (2023) held that an arbitral tribunal is subject to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution; however, the exercise of such powers is limited to exceptional circumstances. The non-obstante clause in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act does not override the constitutional powers under Article 227.
Case Title: SJK Buildcon LLP vs. Kusum Pandurang Keni & Ors (Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 20834 of 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 148
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) cannot be invoked to circumvent the statutory protection afforded to tenants under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (“Rent Act”). Interim measures under Section 9 must aid arbitral proceedings and cannot override or conflict with special statutory mechanisms under the Rent Act for eviction and redevelopment. The Court observed that issues involving protected tenants must be adjudicated by the Small Causes Court under Section 33 of the Rent Act, which is a non-obstante provision. Section 9 of the Act cannot be used to seek relief of ‘speedy eviction’ where tenancy rights are upheld by a binding decree.
Case Title: Bholashankar Ramsuresh Dubey Versus Dinesh Narayan Tiwari and Ors. (WRIT PETITION NO. 17174 OF 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 149
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice N. J. Jamadar has held that the dispute cannot be refused referral to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) based solely on mere allegations of fraud simpliciter, unless serious allegations of fraud that go to the root of the partnership deed containing the arbitration clause are established. The Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. V/s. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd (2011) held that the following categories of cases are generally considered unsuitable for the ADR process due to their nature.Cases involving serious and specific allegations of fraud, fabrication of documents, forgery, impersonation, or coercion and cases involving prosecution for criminal offences.
The court also noted that the Supreme Court in A. Ayyasamy V. A. Paramasivam (2016) held that It follows that cases involving serious allegations of fraud—especially those resembling criminal offences, involving complex issues requiring detailed evidence, or challenging the validity of the contract or arbitration clause itself are non-arbitrable and should be decided by civil courts.
Case Title: Elite Housing LLP Versus The Spectrum CHS Ltd. (COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO.155 OF 2025)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 151
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that objections related to the terms of the redevelopment agreement raised by members of the society can be decided only by the appropriate forum having jurisdiction over such issues. These matters cannot be adjudicated under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The court at the outset noted that the redevelopment is stalled solely due to unresolved disputes over two flats Flat No. 6 and Flat No. 12 among family members. While objections regarding entitlements and procedural lapses have been raised, these are to be addressed by appropriate regulatory or quasi-judicial authorities. The core issue remains the absence of documentation for the two flats, which is unjustifiably halting the entire project.
Case Title: Tata Capital Limited v. Vijay Devij Aiya (COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 237 AND 243 OF 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 158
The Bombay High Court Bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan while disposing an application for appointment of arbitrator has observed that an arbitration clause which gives option to only one party to opt out of the arbitration agreement is not invalid per se. Such arbitration agreement can be saved by eliminating the unilateral option or by making such right bilateral.
The Court discussed the context in which the Tata Capital judgment was decided by the Delhi High Court. The context was of the borrower having filed a suit and the lender having asserted the right to file a written statement. On being denied that right, the lender appealed and secured its right to file the written statement. After securing such right, the lender argued that no civil suit would lie. It was in the context of such provocative and irreconcilable conduct that the court ruled that there was an absence of mutuality which was fatal to the agreement. The Court observed that the ruling on absence of mutuality rendering the arbitration agreement to be illegal should be read in this context and not in absolute terms.
Case Title – IMAX Corporation v. E-City Entertainment (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Others (Commercial Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 38267 of 2024)
Citation – 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 162
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and M.M. Sathaye has observed that when a common arbitration petition seeking recognition, enforcement and execution of a foreign award is declined against all the respondents, the mere fact that some respondents had successfully filed chamber summons seeking deletion of their names would not render the appeal filed under Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as not maintainable.
The Court placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in M/s Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 356 and Government of India v. Vedanta Limited and Others (2010) 10 SCC 1 to discuss the proposition of law that while seeking enforcement of foreign award, there is no need to take separate proceedings, one for deciding the enforceability of the foreign award to make it rule of the court and another to take up execution thereafter.
Case Title: Kapani Resorts Private Limited Parsha V/s. Manmohan Kapani
Case Number:2025:BHC-OS:7019
The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe And Justice M. S. Karnik has upheld the order passed by the Single Judge under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), injuncting the owner of the Kailash property and Kapani Resorts from alienating or disposing of any interest in the properties until the completion of the arbitral proceedings.
Case Title: Indiabulls Infraestate Ltd. Versus Imagine Realty Pvt. Ltd.
Case Number: 2025:BHC-OS:6783
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that even though the term “substitution” is mentioned under Section 29-A(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), an arbitrator cannot be substituted in an application under this section unless the grounds specified in Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act are satisfied, which outline the conditions under which an arbitrator may be substituted.
Case Title – Kisanlal Bairudas Jain and Ors. v. Union of India
Neutral Citation – 2025: BHC- AC:21612-DB
The Division Bench of Bombay High Court comprising Justices Jitendra Jain and M.S. Sonak allowed writ petitions seeking enhanced solatium under National Highways Act, 1956 in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v Tarsem Singh and Ors. While doing so the Court rejected the argument of the Respondent that the petitions ought to be dismissed as the Petitioners have an alternate remedy under Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”)
The Court held that while exercising its powers under Section 37, ACA the Court is not empowered to modify the award and grant enhanced compensation. This would make Section 37 an inefficacious alternate remedy and in view of this fact the Court can exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226, Constitution of India.
Case Title: Union of India Through The General Manager Central Railway Versus PLR HC RBR JV
Case Number: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO.51 OF 2024
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that a contractor cannot be denied payment for extra work that, while beyond the original scope of the agreement, was clearly consented to by the other party through its conduct. When such work is accepted, measured, and not objected to contemporaneously, the benefiting party cannot later claim it was beyond the contract’s scope. To allow this would amount to unjust enrichment.
The court noted that the work was executed in line with the Agreement under the active supervision of Railways officials, especially during the Covid-19 lockdown. Extensions were granted based on ground realities. Despite alleging deficiencies, the Railways made no counterclaim in arbitration. Joint measurements, approved RA Bills, and prior conduct confirmed acceptance of excess work.
It observed that the Arbitral Tribunal rightly held that the Railways’ conduct indicated consensual and documented expansion of work, and it could not rely on the absence of a formal amendment to deny payment. The Tribunal’s findings are reasonable, well-supported, and cannot be faulted.
Case Title: Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited and Anr.
Case Number: ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 1752 OF 2015 and ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 1753 OF 2015
The Bombay High Court has upheld an arbitral award granting damages amounting to 538.9 crore to Kochi Cricket Private Limited (“KCPL”), the parent company of defunct IPL franchise Kochi Tuskers Kerala. It was held that the Court cannot act as a Court of First Appeal and delve into a fact-finding exercise by revisiting and re-appreciating the record and accepting competing interpretations of the various clauses of the agreements between the parties by invoking the ground of perversity.
The bench of Justice Riyaz Iqbal Chagla observed that the Arbitrator adjudicated the core issue, i.e., whether Board of Control for Cricket in India (“BCCI”) has wrongfully invoked the bank guarantee furnished by Rendezvous Sports World (“RSW”) and whether this amounted to a repudiatory breach of KCPL’s Franchise Agreement (“KCPL-FA”), by considering the material facts and documents on record as well as the evidence recorded.
Calcutta High Court
Case Title: M/S. Sauryajyoti Renewables Pvt.Ltd. Vs VSL Re Power Private Limited
Case Number: AP/COM- 63 Of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that a composite reference of disputes to arbitration arising out of distinct purchase and service orders can be made when the conduct of the parties demonstrates that they were all part of a single business transaction.
The court further observed that a composite invocation under 21 of the Arbitration Act for the consolidated claim of the petitioner regarding purchase and service orders as well as the challenge to their termination by the respondent was valid. The invocation clearly outlines the details of the orders and the nature of disputes. Email communications further show that both parties consistently treated the purchase and service orders as part of the same business relationship.
Case Title: SRI SWAPAN PAUL VS M/S. PAUL CONSTRUCTION
Case Number: AP NO. 28 OF 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that when a claim is ex facie time-barred and no trial is needed to determine whether it is barred by limitation, the referral court can refuse to refer the matter to arbitration under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Another vs. Nortel Networks India Private Limited (2021) while observing that although the arbitration petition was not barred by limitation, yet the cause of action for the underlying claims having arisen much earlier, the claims were clearly barred by limitation on the day notice for arbitration was invoked.
Case: DEEPAK BHARGAVA & ORS. VS. JAGRATI TRADE SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ORS.
Case No: AP-COM/388/2024
The Calcutta High Court has held that in arbitral proceedings, the direction for refund of the deposited consideration amount with interest has to be considered in the background of the conduct of the parties and their admissions during the proceedings.
A division bench of Justices Soumen Sen and Biswaroop Chowdury held:
The learned arbitrator rejected the claim for specific performance of the contract as claimed by the present appellants. However, the appellants were directed to refund the sum of Rs.19.90 crores (approximately) which was admittedly received by the appellants from the claimants towards consideration. Interest was also granted on the same…The direction for refund of the amount with interest has to be considered in the background of the conduct of the parties and their admissions in the proceeding. The proceeding before an arbitrator is not a proceeding before a court of law. An element of informality is attached to such proceeding and the views of the arbitrator as appear from the award is required to be considered in the said perspective and keeping in mind the immunity that an award enjoys under the Act.
Case Title: M/S GREENBILT INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED VS M/S A B DINESH CONCRETE PRIVATE LIMITED
Case Number:AP (COM) 421 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that an arbitration clause in a memorandum of understanding that was not finalized, as indicated by the correspondences between the parties, cannot serve as the basis for initiating arbitration proceedings. The court further said that the MOU remained in draft form without essential details which made it incomplete. Even if lack of response of the petitioner to the e-mail sent through which the draft MOU was communicated is accepted, there was no agreement to confer jurisdiction to the court at Calcutta as the cause of action arose in Odisha and Raipur/Chhattisgarh.
Case Title:Balasore Alloys Limited vs. Flynt Mining LLP
Case Number: AP-COM/896/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that merely because a dispute resolution mechanism is provided in a clause empowering the signatories to the contract to resolve the dispute, it cannot be inferred that the parties intended to refer the dispute to arbitration. Such a clause amounts to an in-house mechanism and not a reference to an impartial arbitral tribunal, especially when impartiality is clearly lacking as the very individuals who signed the contract are themselves empowered to decide the dispute.
The court at the outset observed that the clause 16 of the Agreement, though does not mention the word “arbitration,” does not become invalid solely on that ground. If the dispute resolution clause reflects a clear intention of the parties to refer disputes to a private tribunal for an impartial decision after providing both parties a fair opportunity to present their case and if they have agreed to be bound by such decision, it would constitute a valid arbitration agreement despite the absence of the word “arbitration.” As held in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and ors. (2007).
Case Number: AP-COM/39/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Facilitation Council cannot reject the arbitrable claims of the supplier without providing an opportunity to present evidence in support of the same, especially when mediation, as required under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act) has failed. As per law, the Council is then mandated to either adjudicate the arbitrable matter itself or refer it to an institution providing alternative dispute resolution services.
The court observed that the law mandates that once mediation fails, the Council must either handle the arbitration itself or refer the dispute to an institutional centre. Proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration Act thereafter. The Council is required to allow both parties to present evidence. It further added that the Council noted that the claimant alleged the 2016 Job Completion Certificate was withheld, yet failed to address this as a dispute. Instead, the claim was rejected due to the absence of the certificate. The respondent had not presented arguments but only requested time to file a reply.
Case Title: TATA CAPITAL LIMITED VS KRISHNA KANT TIWARI
Case Number: AP-COM/1035/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that once all liabilities, rights, and obligations are transferred to an entity through a merger approved by the competent forum, the arbitration clause contained in a loan agreement executed between the parties prior to the merger can be invoked by a third party that has acquired all such rights and liabilities post-merger.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in ‘Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel, (2025)’ held that the intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement can be gauged from the circumstances that surround the participation of the non-signatory party in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the underlying contract containing such agreement. The Apex Court also held that the nature or standard of involvement of the non-signatory in the performance of the contract should be such that the non signatory has actively assumed obligations or performance upon itself under the contract.
Case Title: SATYA NARAYAN SHAW VERSUS SOURAV GHOSH
Case Number: AP-COM/154/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that when a scheme generally applicable to all auction related disputes contains an arbitration clause, that clause will govern disputes arising between the parties, unless a contrary scheme without such a clause is shown.
The court at the outset noted that the Scheme provides for sale of coal via e-auction for May 2009 and includes an arbitration clause. In this case, the e-auction took place in January 2010. The respondent failed to produce any scheme without such a clause or prove that the arbitration clause was inapplicable. It further added that disputes arose regarding change of rakes, refund of money, and non-delivery of coal. The respondent no. 3 allegedly failed to load two rakes despite advance payment. The reason for non-loading is an arbitrable issue.
Case Title: Ashok Kumar Bhuinya Proprietor Of A.K. Enterprise Vs State Of West Bengal
Case Number: AP/344/2022
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that an application under Section 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), seeking substitution of the arbitrator, cannot be allowed when the petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn from the arbitral proceedings and failed to participate despite being given ample opportunities, especially after a long lapse of time.
Case Title: Sunil Kumar Samanta Vs. Smt. Sikha Mondal
Case Number: AP/15/2022
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sakar has held that if a clause in an agreement gives the parties discretion to refer the matter to arbitration after disputes have arisen, it cannot be construed as a binding arbitration agreement. Such invocation of the arbitration clause requires fresh consent of the other party before the matter can be referred to arbitration.
The court at the outset observed that the arbitration clause provides that the lessor will be bound to renew the lease for subsequent periods of the same tenure if the lessee exercises the option, and the rent and terms shall be mutually agreed upon. In case of failure to agree, it may be decided by an arbitrator appointed by the parties. It further added that the use of the expression may indicates that the parties had agreed that they may approach arbitration in future. May implies a possibility, not a binding agreement. The meeting of minds to refer disputes to arbitration is not evident from the clause. An arbitration clause must show that parties agreed they shall refer disputes to arbitration and be bound by the decision of a private tribunal.
Case Title: Jagat Singh Manot Versus The Municipal Commissioner, Kolkata Municipal Corporation And Ors.
Case Number: W.P.O. 503 OF 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Gaurang Kanth has held that although disputes relating to the cancellation of written instruments under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are arbitrable, the resulting awards are binding only on the parties involved and not on third parties who were not part of the arbitral proceedings.
The court further observed that under Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, an instrument can be cancelled only in two situations. If the instrument is void or voidable against the person concerned, or When both parties mutually agree to cancel the deed.In the first case, the concerned person must initiate a suit to have the instrument adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, at its discretion, declare it so and order its cancellation.
Case Title: Gallant Equipment Pvt Ltd Vs Rashmi Metaliks Ltd
Case Number: AP-COM/277/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that although an injunction against the invocation of a bank guarantee cannot normally be granted, if the petitioner establishes a prima facie case, the court should not hesitate to grant interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The court also opined that the principles under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 38 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) are not strictly applicable to Section 9 applications under the Arbitration Act. If the petitioner establishes a case for interim protection, the Court should not hesitate to grant such relief until the arbitral proceedings are concluded.
Case Title: M/S Doon’s Caterers Vs M/S Indian Railway Catering And Tourism Corporation Limited
Case Number :AP-COM/268/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that whether the subsequent revision of the original menu by IRCTC form part of the original contract containing an arbitration clause is a matter to be decided by the Arbitrator.
The court further opined that under the “Specification” section of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), Clause (j) states that the supply schedule, i.e., the menu, is subject to change at the sole discretion of IRCTC/Railways, and IRCTC’s decision would be binding. It is undisputed that IRCTC revised the menu based on the flexibility granted by the Ministry of Railways and instructed all General Managers of the zones to implement the modified menu.
Case Title: M/S Krishna Construction Vs The Chief General Manager Metro Railway And Ors
Case Number:AP-COM/253/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the appointment of an arbitrator by the General Manager of Metro Railways in a dispute between Metro Railways and the contractor is barred by Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Therefore, the General Manager cannot be permitted to appoint the arbitrator.
The Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A joint Venture Company (2024) held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate the principle of equal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution, compromising the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. The Apex Court further added that such clauses, allowing one party to appoint an arbitrator without the other’s participation, create an unfair imbalance. The principle of express waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act allows parties to waive allegations of bias after disputes arise, but cannot justify an inherently unequal appointment process.
Case Title: Lakhotia Metalizers Private Limited Vs Matashree Snacks Pvt. Ltd.
Case Number:AP-COM/129/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that once conciliation fails under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act), the Council may either conduct the arbitration itself or refer the matter to an arbitral institution. As per Section 18(3) of the MSME Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) apply to such arbitration proceedings.
The court at the outset noted that the present application is premature, as the petitioner has not sought interim protection from the arbitral tribunal. As per Section 9(3) of the Arbitration Act, once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court should not entertain an application for interim measures unless it finds that remedies under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act are not efficacious.
Case Title: Johnson Controls Hitachi Air Conditioning India Ltd. Vs M/S. Shapoorji Pallonji And Company Pvt Ltd.
Case Number:AP-COM/315/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the very acceptance of an offer at a consolidated price for works to be executed at different locations proves that the work orders issued were treated as part of a single transaction by the parties through their conduct therefore under such circumstances a composite reference of all work orders can be made to arbitration. The court at the outset discussed the impermissibility of unilateral appointment of arbitrator an noted that the Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another vs. HSCC (India) Ltd. 2019 held that whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice is counter-balanced by the equal power vested in the other party. However, where only one party has the right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice carries an element of exclusivity in determining the course of dispute resolution.
Case Title: P & P Business Private Limited vs. Marco Francesco Shoes (India) Private Limited
Case Number: C.O.140 of 2023
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Bihas Ranjan De. has observed that an arbitrator can indeed fix his remuneration, and this can be done in a manner that may not comply with the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provided that such a decision is made in consultation with the parties involved. When parties contractually agree on a fee, the Fourth Schedule will not be applicable.
The court held that a party cannot file a revision application under Article 227 of the Constitution solely based on dissatisfaction with an arbitrator’s order regarding quantum of remuneration as it does not fall within the scope of Section 37 (2) of the Act. The appropriate recourse available to the petitioner would be to challenge the final award under Section 34 of the Act.
Case Title: Sri Arun Kumar Jindal & Anr. VS. Smt. Rajni Poddar & Ors.
Case Number:C.O.441 of 2023
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Bibhas Ranjan De has held that withdrawal of an execution petition for enforcement of an arbitral award on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, when such ground is clearly stated in the withdrawal application, does not bar the petitioner from refiling before the appropriate forum, even if the court’s order does not expressly grant liberty to refile. Accordingly, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) cannot be denied.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. M/s Durga Construction Co. held that Cases of delay in re-filing differ from those of initial filing, as the party has already demonstrated intent to seek legal remedies by taking preliminary steps. Thus, it cannot be presumed that they have abandoned their right to legal recourse.
The Apex Court further held that however, if the initial filing is grossly inadequate or contains fundamental defects, it may be treated as nonest, with no legal effect. In such instances, only the date on which defects are rectified would be considered the actual date of filing.
Case Title: Star Track Agency Private Limited Vs. Efcalon Tie Up Private Limited
Case Number:F.M.A.T. No. 57 of 2021
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Uday Kumar has held that considering alternative propositions by the Arbitrator and proceeding on the premise that the award holder would be entitled to an interim award under either scenario does not amount to an inherent contradiction. Evaluating alternatives is a legitimate judicial exercise and does not tantamount to perversity.
The court noted that in view of the lease of the licensor itself having not been renewed at that point of time by the superior landlord, it was not possible to grant a sub-lease of the premises to the licensee, for which only a license was being granted instead of a sub-lease.
Case Title: INDIA AND OTHERS VERSUS SUNIL SAHA AND OTHERS
Case Number: MAT 806 OF 2024 AND FMA 735 OF 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Chaitali Chatterjee (Das) has held that when there are no disputes or differences between the parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause, a writ petition may be entertained against a third party for arbitrary deduction of demurrage amounts. The existence of an arbitration clause between the contracting parties cannot, by itself, be a ground to refuse the maintainability of such a writ petition.
Case Title: VIRGO SOFTECH LIMITED & ANR. VS SREI EQUIPMENT FINANCE LTD.
Case Number: AP-COM/361/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that non-consideration of a judgment of the Supreme Court amounts to patent illegality, which is a valid ground for setting aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) particularly when the award is passed by an arbitrator unilaterally appointed by one party.
The Supreme Court recently in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A joint Venture Company after citing its own judgment in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another vs. HSCC (India) Ltd.(2019) held that the reason is clear that whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get counter-balanced by equal power with the other party.
Case Title: The Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. The Reliance Jute Mills (International Limited)
Case Number: AP-COM/186/2024 Old Case No. AP/322/2020
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Aniruddha Roy has held that once the liability or quantum of a claim under an insurance policy is established, the Insurance Company must not withhold the claim amount and must comply with Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) Circular which entitles the Insured to claim a higher amount.
It further held that the Circular clearly provided that if an insured is dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, they are entitled to approach judicial or statutory forums for higher compensation. Execution of a discharge vouche.
Case Title: Dhananjai Lifestyle Limited vs. Sanvie Retail Private Limited
Case Number: AP-COM/980/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act can be sought by the MSME only after mandatory conciliation before the MSME Council fails and the dispute proceeds to arbitration—either conducted by the Council or referred to an arbitral institution. Only then do the provisions of the Arbitration Act apply. Consequently, seeking relief under the Arbitration Act during conciliation is clearly prohibited under section 77 of the Arbitration Act.
The Court further added that however, an exception allows such proceedings if necessary to preserve rights, but only in exceptional cases. This reflects the legislature’s intent to promote non-adversarial dispute resolution. In this case, the petitioner has already issued a notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act following cheque dishonour.
Case Title: Mittal Technopack Private Limited Vs Ideal Real Estate Private Limited And Anr.
Case Number: AP-COM/413/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the appropriate forum for seeking interim relief after the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal is the Tribunal itself under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Recourse to the court under Section 9 is permitted during the arbitration proceedings only if the remedy under Section 17 is found to be inefficacious.
The court observed that a post-award injunction application under Section 9(1) allows a party to seek interim relief from the Court after the arbitral award but before its enforcement under Section 36. However, per Section 9(3), once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the Court will only entertain such applications if remedies under Section 17 are ineffective.
Case Title: Steel Authority of India Limited Vs H. R. Construction Private Limited
Case Number: C.O. 4004 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) has held that an amendment to the original claim may be permitted during arbitral proceedings, even at the stage of final arguments, particularly when costs have been imposed on the party seeking the amendment and accepted by the opposite party—provided the amendment does not materially alter the nature of the original claim or cause prejudice.
It further held that while Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) provisions may be applied in arbitration, they are not to be strictly enforced to bar such amendments under Order VI Rule 17, given the more flexible framework of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Case Title: The Board of Major Port Authority for the Syama Prasad Mukherjee Port, Kolkata Vs. Marinecraft Engineers Private Limited
Case Number: A.P.-COM No.296 of 2024 (Old No. A.P. 179 of 2023)
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya has held that once arbitral proceedings commenced under Section 18(3) under the MSME Act, the process could not be reversed to reinitiate pre-arbitral conciliation. The Council did not do so either. It was only at the petitioner’s request that additional avenues for mutual settlement were explored alongside the arbitration. Upon the failure of these efforts, the Council proceeded to decide the matter on merits.
The court noted that the timeline stipulated under Section 29A of the 1996 Act are not applicable to an arbitral proceeding under the 2006 Act. Rather, the period stipulated under Section 18(5) of the 2006 Act is the relevant guiding factor. However, the latter period is directory and not mandatory.
It further observed that unlike Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act, Section 18(5) of the 2006 Act prescribes a 90-day timeline for arbitral proceedings without imposing a penalty for delay or terminating the Council’s mandate, indicating the provision is directory, not mandatory.
Case Title:SREI EQUIPMENT FINANCE LIMITED VS TRINITY ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MANAGERS LIMITED
Case Number: AP-COM/1049/2024 IA GA-COM 1 of 2025 GA-COM 2 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that at this stage, the petitioner is adequately secured under the schedule to the deeds of hypothecation agreement. The respondent remains fully operational and continues its business activities. There is nothing in the pleadings to suggest that the respondent has attempted to remove or alienate its assets in a manner that would render any future award in favour of the petitioner unenforceable or illusory.
The court noted that the petitioner’s claim of Rs. 53.61 crores being due is unsupported by any admission from the respondent. While the petitioner valued certain investments at Rs. 12.41 crores, additional investments disclosed in this proceeding were valued at Rs. 41.04 crores. It further observed that although the petitioner disputes these valuations, no concrete calculations have been provided to disprove them. Further examination would amount to a mini-trial, and investment values are subject to market fluctuations. The charge on these investments was created consciously between experienced commercial entities, with no evidence of malafide conduct by the respondent.
Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: Angelique International Limited versus Union of India Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) and Ors.
Case Number: WPC No. 2946 of 2025
The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru has held that reliefs similar to those already sought before the Arbitrator and subsequently before the Commercial Court cannot be claimed before the writ court, especially when alternative efficacious remedies are available before the same forums for seeking such reliefs.
The court noted that perusal of the record would show that there were two Contract Agreements i.e. Contract Agreement dated 18.09.2017 as well as Contract Agreement dated 26.04.2017 and the petitioner has challenged Contract Agreement dated 26.04.2017 before the Sole Arbitrator, which was allowed vide order dated 15.03.2022 and the final award was passed. It further noted that the record reflects that the respondents challenged the final award dated 15.03.2022 by filing Case No. Arb. MJC 06 of 2024, which was dismissed by the Commercial Court vide order dated 08.11.2024.
Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/s Brij Lal & Sons v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 397
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Dharmesh Sharma while dismissing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has observed that delay in publication of award does not invalidate the award unless it is shown that the award has materially affected the rights of the parties.
The Court further discussed the scope of the expression “the public policy of India” contained in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Court placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 wherein it was observed, “However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice”. In view of the aforesaid propositions of law, the Court held that it was unable to find any illegality, perversity in the impugned award passed by the arbitrator. A perusal of the record indicated that the parties were heard at length and the claims were duly considered. There was no issue of any proceeding being unfair or violative of the principles of natural justice in the course of arbitration.
Case Title: NHAI v. Ssyangyong Engineering Construction Co. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 403
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has observed that in an international commercial arbitration in terms of Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the IVth Schedule pertaining to fees of the arbitrator will not apply mandatorily in view of Explanation to Section 11(14) of the Act.
The Court concluded that the assertion by the Petitioner that the fees had been unilaterally fixed by the Arbitral Tribunal was not borne out from the record. Further, reliance placed on of ONGC Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV in which it has been observed that unilateral determination of fees violates the principle of party autonomy and the doctrine of the prohibition of in rem suam decisions was wholly inapplicable in the context of the facts of the present case.
Case Title – M/s Pavan Metal Refiners v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 418
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has observed that at the stage of appointment of arbitrator under Section 11, A&C, the referral court should limit its inquiry to whether the petition itself is within the limitation period of three years and should leave the question of whether the claims are deadwood to the arbitral tribunal.
The Court noted that two major grounds for opposition to the present petition had been raised by the Respondents, namely non-existence of arbitration clause and limitation. In so far as the first contention was concerned, the Respondents had argued that Clause 2905(a) did not apply to the present dispute as it had first arisen in 2001. However, the Court noted that a perusal of the letter dated 20.10.2021 showed that the Respondents did not raise even a sliver of doubt regarding the applicability of the arbitration clause. Similarly, in a follow up letter dated 20.10.2021, by which the Respondents refused the request of the Petitioner regarding appointment of sole arbitrator on the ground that the claims were time barred, no mention regarding the inapplicability of the arbitration clause was made.
Case Title – Hariram & Ors. V. NHAI
Case No. – O.M.P. (COMM) 86/2021
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has observed that a writ petition cannot be construed as an “earlier application” under Section 42 of the Arbitration Act to decide jurisdiction as the very nature of a writ petition is to challenge an administrative action or a legal decision, not to initiate arbitration proceedings. Section 42 specifically refers to an “application made in a Court with respect to an arbitration agreement,” which implies an initial application to commence or regulate arbitration, rather than a challenge to an existing decision.
The Court observed that in view of Section 2, A&C Act, the relevant Court would be the one having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. The Court observed that in view of the factual matrix, there was nothing to show that this Court had the territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The impugned arbitral award dated 16.10.2020 under Section 3G(5) and 3G(6), NHAI Act was rendered in Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh, all proceedings in arbitration were also conducted in Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh and even the land that was the subject matter of the impugned arbitral award is situated in Uttar Pradesh.
Case Title – Kiran Suran v. Satish Kumar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 445
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Navin Chawla and Ravinder Dudeja has observed that the delivery of a copy of the Award to the Power of Attorney holder, who has also represented the party in the arbitral proceedings, shall be a due compliance with Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. Citing a plethora of case laws including Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 2, the Court observed that it is settled law that the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act would commence only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application for setting it aside. The main question for determination in the present case was whether the Appellant had received the impugned award.
The Court noted that the Appellant had challenged the Power of Attorney as being forged, this question and issued could not be determined in a petition filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act against the impugned award. Additionally, the Court had not been informed of the Appellant having instituted any independent proceedings challenging the said Power of Attorney till that date.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 456
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja has held that the grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) is mandatory. The only discretion which the Arbitral Tribunal has is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded. Where the Arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, then statutory rate, as provided in Section 31(7)(b), shall apply.
It noted that the section consists of two distinct parts: Clause (a) deals with the interest that may be granted up to the date of the award, whereas Clause (b) provides that “a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum from the date of award to the date of payment”. The Court clarified that Clause (b) is concerned with post-award interest and stated: “What Clause (b) provides for is that Arbitral Tribunal may award interest on the sum adjudged under Clause (a). But if no such interest is awarded, then there shall be interest at the rate of 18%.”
Case Title: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd Versus Vihaan Networks Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 491
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia dismissed BSNL’s appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) holding that the Single Judge correctly upheld the Arbitrator’s finding that Vihaan Networks Limited carried out the work under the Advance Purchase Order, issued on BSNL’s specific instructions, which was later withdrawn. Therefore, the Respondent was rightly compensated under the principle of quantum meruit for the losses incurred.
The court at the outset observed that it is settled law that the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is very limited. The Court cannot independently assess the evidence or merits of the arbitral award. Its jurisdiction is confined to examining whether the power under Section 34 was exercised within its scope.
It further added that an appeal under Section 37 cannot go beyond the limits set by Section 34. If the arbitral award reflects a possible and reasonable view based on the evidence, the petition under Section 34 must be dismissed, and the appeal under Section 37 cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different finding.
Case Title – Railtel Corporation of India Limited v. Primatel Fibcom Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 496
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has observed that where the disputes between the parties are already the subject matter of an earlier arbitral reference, a separate notice under Section 21, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) would not be necessary for separate proceedings to adjudicate counter claims.
The Court observed that while it is true that the notice under Section 21, ACA is a sine qua non of arbitration proceedings but where arbitration proceedings have been initiated by one party seeking for reference for the arbitration proceedings under Section 21, ACA for adjudication of disputes, a separate notice under Section 21, ACA would not be necessary only for the purposes of counter claim. This is not the mandate of ACA. Thus, the instant petition need not be dismissed only on the ground that further notice for the purpose of counter claim was not given.
Case Title: Shristi Infrastructure Development vs Scorpio Engineering Private Limited and Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 521
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh held that an ad-hoc arbitrator (appointed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) is empowered to grant interest rate contemplated under Section 16 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, even if the reference was not made to the MSME Facilitation Council for resolving disputes.
The High Court further held that under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, reference to the Facilitation Council is optional and not mandatory. Since Scorpio had not approached the Facilitation Council, Section 18 of the MSMED Act was not triggered. Therefore, the ordinary arbitral proceedings were valid and unaffected.
Case Title: SMAS Auto Leasing India Private Limited v. Gensol Engineering Limited & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 528
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has granted interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the the petitioner who is the owner of electric vehicles (EVs) leased under Master Lease Agreements upon apprehensions of financial distress, default in lease payments by the respondents and a risk of dissipation or deterioration of assets pending arbitration. The Court restrained the respondents from transferring or encumbering the EVs.
Case Title – Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 538
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that a judgment debtor is not entitled to move objections under Section 47, CPC in an application for execution of award under Section 36, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) as it would amount to effectively opening a second round for challenging the Award which would undermine the provision of section 34 i.e. challenge to Award on limited grounds and go against the intent of ACA.
The Court clarified that the provisions of CPC are only applicable to the extent of “enforcement” of an Award such as attachment, sale, auction, detention etc. which are reflected in Order XXI, CPC. The legislature did not intend to permit a challenge to an Award during enforcement proceedings again on merits as this would be contrary to the objectives of ACA which aim to ensure finality and limited judicial interference.
Case Title – Hindustan Construction Company Ltd v. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 551
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has observed that it is not open to the referral court in a petition filed under Section 11, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) to examine the issue whether the claim is barred by res judicata. Such an examination falls within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court observed that it is settled that in the scope of jurisdiction under Section 11, ACA, the referral Court does not examine the tenability of the claims sought to be referred to arbitration by the applicant. The enquiry at this stage of appointment of arbitrator is restricted to the existence of arbitration agreement and/or whether the petition itself is barred by limitation.
Case Title: UNION OF INDIA Versus M/S GR-GAWA R(J.V.)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 565
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that an initial filing made without the essential documents like attaching impugned award etc. required for adjudication is non est in law and has no legal existence. Such a filing, made merely to evade the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be considered valid. The court at the outset noted that the final filing dated 20.01.2025 spans 6,677 pages, in stark contrast to the initial 146-page filing. This significant disparity clearly indicates that the initial filing was a mere formality, intended only to halt the limitation period.
It further added that the skeletal nature of the original filing, lacking essential pleadings and annexures, reflects an attempt to bypass the limitation law. Such a filing cannot be regarded as a bona fide institution of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Case Title:M/S Rhine Power Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/S Ramprastha Promoters And Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 568
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Anish Dayal has held that the contempt court is empowered to issue directions to reverse any benefits obtained in disobedience of an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) to ensure that parties are restrained from violating the court’s orders.
The Supreme Court in Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v Hiralal Somabhai Contractor (2023) held that the contempt court does have the power to declare a contemptuous transaction as void, even if such transfer pendente lite is not void ab initio under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The Apex Court further held that in contempt proceedings, the court can declare such transactions void or direct their reversal to ensure that the contemnor does not benefit from disobedience of court orders. This includes issuing appropriate directions to authorities to nullify any advantage gained through such contumacious conduct, thereby upholding the majesty of law.
Case Title: DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Versus M/S NARAINDAS R ISRANI
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 570
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that different formulae may be applied depending on the circumstances, and the choice of method for computing damages falls within the arbitrator’s discretion. Sections 55 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Contract Act) do not prescribe any specific formula for the calculation of damages. Therefore, the arbitrator’s decision to apply any internationally recognized method, based on their expertise, cannot be faulted.
The court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) reviewed the evidence, including the hindrance register, and concluded that the delay was attributable to the petitioner. These are factual findings within the AT’s domain, and this Court will not reappreciate the evidence or assess its sufficiency. Based on the above, it held that there is no patent illegality or apparent error in the award. As for the lack of detailed calculations, the AT’s reasoning sufficiently explains the partial allowance of the claim and the basis for the awarded amount.
Case Title: RINKOO AGGARWAL versus GAURAV SABHARWAL & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 572
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has held that the bar of limitation for filing an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) seeking the appointment of an arbitrator, cannot be circumvented merely on the ground that the demand-cum-arbitration invocation notice was issued by the petitioner’s counsel without proper authorization. The court held that such a contention, if accepted, would render the limitation period for filing such applications meaningless and defeat the very purpose of prescribing a time frame.
The Court also noted that the Apex Court further clarified that while determining the issue of limitation in a petition under Section 11(6), the referral Court would confine its inquiry to examining whether the petition is within the period of limitation of 03 years or not. It further said that the referral Court will not conduct an intricate evidentiary inquiry into the question whether the claims raised by the applicant are time barred and this would be left for determination by the Arbitrator.
Case Title – M.V. Omni Projects (India) Ltd. v. Union of India through Chief Engineer Northern Railways & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 573
Th Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that the party giving no-objection to the applicability of Section 12(5), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) has to give such no-objection after the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The waiver to applicability has to be done after the arbitrators are appointed with the names and details. The Court also observed that any waiver before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is no waiver in the eyes of law.
The Court observed that the waiver contemplated in the proviso of Section 12(5), ACA applies not to the manner or the mechanism under which the Arbitral Tribunal is to be constituted but to the constitution/individual members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband v. United Telecom (2019) 5 SCC 755, whereby it was clarified that “express agreement in writing” to waive refers to a “person” who is interdicted by the Seventh Schedule. If an individual falls within any of the categories as mentioned in the Seventh Schedule, then the said person/s are ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator and only to remove the ineligibility, the party may waive by an express agreement the said ineligibility in writing qua the person/s who are ineligible to be appointed.
Case Title: UNION OF INDIA Versus AHLUWALIA CONTRACTS (INDIA) LTD.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 576
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia has held that unless it is demonstrated that the delay in payment for the completion of the work contract prevented the contractor from undertaking other profitable ventures, damages for loss of profits cannot be awarded.
The court noted that the 15% mark-up under the contract applies only to deviations involving extra items, quantities, or substitutions, to cover overheads and costs. However, the respondent’s claim did not arise from such deviations but sought compensation for costs incurred due to prolongation of the contract, which was allegedly caused by the appellant. Based on the above, it held that the Arbitral Tribunal’s rejection of the respondent’s claim, citing the 15% mark-up under Schedule ‘F’, is unsustainable. Clause 2(x) of Schedule ‘F’ does not apply to claims for additional costs due to prolongation of work. Therefore, the award is vitiated by patent illegality to that extent.
Case Title: MDD Medical Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Delhi International Arbitration Centre and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 581
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, while hearing a writ petition challenging the decision of Delhi International Arbitration Centre (Respondent No. 1) to revive arbitral proceeding after closing the proceedings due to non-filing of the State of Claim (SOC) observed that since the proceedings have been revived, the Arbitral Tribunal is the competent authority to adjudicate and rule upon.
The bench observed that the three-month time limit under Section 18 of the MSMED Act pertains to the reference to the Facilitation Council and not the arbitration. Section 18(3) of the Act states that once a reference is made to arbitration, the provisions of the A&C Act would apply to the dispute. A Co-ordinate Bench in Indian Highways Management Company Limited v. Mukesh & Associates (2021) took the same view wherein it was observed that ‘reference’ in Section 18(5) has to be construed as a reference to the facilitation council. Furthermore, the timeline ascribed under Section 18(5) of the Act is directory and not mandatory, unlike the timeline ascribed under Section 29A of the A&C. Unlike Section 18(5), non-adherence to the prescribed time limit under Section 29A would result in the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator.
Case Title: Tirupati Constwell Private Limited Versus Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 582
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that if, after the issuance of a notice invoking arbitration, no bonafide negotiations take place between the parties, and the limitation period for filing an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) expires, the time allegedly spent in such negotiations cannot be excluded while computing the limitation period under Section 11.
The court noted that in Geo Miller & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2020), the Supreme Court held that although the limitation period may have commenced, the time spent in bonafide negotiations for an amicable settlement would be excluded when determining whether a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act was filed within the limitation period.
Case Title: IIFL HOME FINANCE LTD versus PUNKAJ BHAGCHAND CHHALLANI & ORS
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 583
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that the intent of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be interpreted to confer jurisdiction on a court that is otherwise incompetent to entertain an application under this provision.
The court noted that section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that a written communication is deemed received if sent to the addressee’s last known business or mailing address by any method that records the delivery attempt. In this case, the petitioner has made multiple attempts to serve the respondents, thereby fulfilling its duty to effect service.
It further observed that the arbitration clause in the Standard Terms and Conditions governing the parties’ agreements is silent on the “seat and venue of arbitration.” The Supreme Court, in Ravi Ranjan Developers (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee (2022), held that Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act cannot be interpreted to empower a High Court lacking territorial jurisdiction to entertain an application for the appointment of an arbitrator.
Case Title: RAM KRISHAN ASSOCIATES PVT. LTD. versus ASIAN HOTEL (NORTH) LTD.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 585
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that the appointment of an arbitrator as an observer in a matter unrelated to the arbitration dispute does not constitute de facto or de jure ineligibility under the Fifth or Seventh Schedules of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Consequently, the arbitrator’s mandate cannot be terminated on this ground under Section 14 of the Act. However, the court permitted the petitioner to raise this objection under Section 34 after the award is passed.
The court noted that the Delhi High Court in National Highways Authority of India v. K.K. Sarin & Ors., 2009 held that an important question arises as to whether an unsuccessful challenge to the arbitrator under Section 13(1) of the Arbitration Act confines the aggrieved party’s remedy solely to Section 34, given that Section 13(5) does not refer to Section 14. However, interpreting the provision in this manner would render the concept of de jure inability—such as bias—ineffective.
Case Title: MDD MEDICAL SYSTEMS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. versus DELHI INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE AND ORS.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 591
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that the mandate of the MSME Facilitation Council to refer a dispute to arbitration under Section 18(3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act, following the failure of conciliation under Section 18(2), is not automatically terminated if the referral is not made within 90 days as prescribed under Section 18(5). Unlike Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) Section 18(5) of the MSMED Act does not specify any consequences for non-compliance with the 90-day timeline.
Case Title: Harshvardhan Metals Ltd & Anr. Versus ISF Commodities (P) Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 595
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that Bye-laws may serve as operational guidelines, but they cannot impose conditions that conflict with statutory rights. The Court held that when there is no requirement of depositing the awarded amount as a precondition for filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to set aside an award, any attempt to introduce such a requirement through bye-laws is impermissible.
The court at the outset observed that the right to appeal under Bye-Law 15.40 and the right to challenge an arbitral award under Bye-Law 15.41 must be interpreted harmoniously. Bye-Law 15.40.1 requires a party dissatisfied with an arbitral award to deposit the awarded amount with the Exchange before filing an appeal, reflecting an intent to ensure a genuine financial stake in the outcome.
Case Title: PCL STICCO (JV) versus NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 596
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia has held that once the Judgment Debtor deposits the decretal amount with the court registry pursuant to a court order, and the Award Holder has notice of such deposit, interest on the deposited amount ceases to accrue. Consequently, interest can only be claimed on the remaining outstanding amount, not on the sum deposited with the court.
The court noted that although the Judgment Debtor had challenged the Arbitral Award, no court had passed any stay order or restrained enforcement under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. The Award Holder remained entitled to enforce the Award at all times and had, in fact, filed an enforcement petition under Section 36 on 02.11.2020. In those proceedings, the learned Single Judge directed the Judgment Debtor to deposit the awarded amount with the Registry of the Court.
Case Title – M/s Supreme Infrastructure India Limited v Freyssinet Memard India Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 599
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh while setting aside an arbitral award has observed that unilateral appointment of arbitrator vitiates the award and if the opposite party fails to reply to the notice under Section 21, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”), then such inaction cannot lead to an inference as to implied consent or acquiescence of the party to appointment of the named Arbitrator. The Court held that in such a situation the only recourse available to the party is to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for appointment of an arbitrator.
Case Title: VASISHTA MANTENA NH04 JV & ORS. versus Mr. Ashish Kothari, Adv. BLACKLEAD INFRATECH PVT. LTD.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 603
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Hari Shankar and Ajay Digpaul has held that the benefit of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is available only when the petition is filed within the normal limitation period that is 90 days as prescribed under section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and the court was closed on the last day of that period. It does not apply when the court was closed on the last day of the extendable period under proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
The court at the outset noted that in UOI v. Popular Construction, the Supreme Court held that the time limits prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act—three months plus an extendable period of 30 days—are mandatory. A Section 34 petition cannot be filed beyond this combined period from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. The court further observed that the Section 34 petition was initially presented to the Registry on 21 August 2023 but was not accompanied by any documents, including the copy of the award under challenge.
Case Title: KAL AIRWAYS PRIVATE LIMITED versus SPICEJET LIMITED & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 604
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices C. Harishankar and Ajay Digpaul observed that the conduct of the appellants in this case is deeply troubling to the court’s conscience. They neither informed the respondents about the filing of the present appeals nor disclosed the same to the court, even though the respondents’ appeals challenging the same arbitral award had been listed and heard multiple times. Under these circumstances, the delay in filing and refiling the appeals cannot be condoned due to the appellants’ evident lack of bona fide.
The court at the outset observed that while courts generally adopt a liberal approach toward condoning delays in refiling, this principle is not absolute. The leniency is based on the idea that if a party initially approaches the court in time, delays in curing defects and refiling are usually due to ministerial lapses—often attributable to counsel—and not a delay in seeking legal remedy. Hence, such delays are more readily condoned than delays in the original filing of proceedings.
Case Title: M/S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL Versus M/S MCM WORLDWIDE PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 614
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathanshankar has held that for a valid acknowledgment under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 certain essential requirements must be met. Firstly, the acknowledgment must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired. Secondly, it must pertain specifically to the liability concerning the right in question. Lastly, the acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the party against whom such right is claimed.
Since, in the present case, the liability was acknowledged only after the expiry of the limitation period, the claims could not be adjudicated by the Arbitrator or the District Judge. Consequently, both the award and the District Judge’s order affirming it were set aside on the grounds of public policy and patent illegality.
Case Title: NATIONAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION & ANR. versus M/S ARDEE HI-TECH PVT. LTD.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 615
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that there is no prescribed format for a notice invoking arbitration. The legal requirement is that the party invoking arbitration must clearly outline the disputes between the parties and state that if these disputes remain unresolved, arbitration proceedings will be initiated. The intention to resolve the disputes through arbitration must be explicitly stated in the notice.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Pvt. Ltd. &Anr., 2024 held that when determining the issue of limitation under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, the referral court’s role is limited to examining whether the application has been filed within the three-year limitation period. It should not engage in a detailed inquiry into whether the petitioner’s claims are time-barred.
Case Title – Porto Emporios Shipping Inc v Indian Oil Corporation Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 616
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav while allowing an application under Section 8, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) has observed that the plea of waiver of arbitration clause is a plea concerning rights in personam and does not render the dispute to be manifestly non-arbitrable. Consequently, the determination of such a plea properly falls within the jurisdictional domain of the Arbitral Tribunal itself.
The Court held that the solitary issue for consideration before it was whether under the limited periphery of the scope and extent of enquiry envisaged under Section 8, ACA, the plea of waiver of the arbitration clause could be meticulously examined by the referral court in the present case.
After a detailed analysis of the scheme of ACA, the Court concluded that the legislative scheme couched in Sections 5,8,11,16,34 and 37 of ACA would emphatically underscore that the interjection to arbitral proceedings at the inception is an exception to the general rule.
Case Title: M/S KLA CONST TECHNOLOGIES PVT LTD Versus M/S GULSHAN HOMZ PRIVATE LIMITED
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 623
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that when an exclusive jurisdiction clause is expressly made “subject to” the arbitration clause, and the arbitration clause designates a different territorial location as the seat of arbitration, the arbitration clause prevails. In case of conflict, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the seat designated in the arbitration agreement which overrides the exclusive jurisdictional clause mentioned in the agreement.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Ramkishorelal held that the golden rule of interpretation mandates that the entire document must be read as a whole in order to cull out a true intention of the parties by using the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, while considering the context and background, including the status and expertise of the parties. It further added that where conflicting clauses exist—such as an earlier clause granting absolute title and a later clause imposing restrictions—the former generally prevails if it is clear and unambiguous. Courts should first strive to harmonize conflicting parts, and only if harmony is impossible should the later inconsistent clause be disregarded.
Case Title: LATA YADAV versus SHIVAKRITI AGRO PVT. LTD & ORS.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 696
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Amit Mahajan has held that the mere reference to certain assets in a provisional attachment order does not, by itself, oust the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Similarly, the pendency of parallel investigations by the CBI or ED into allegations of fraud does not bar the arbitrator from adjudicating the dispute. Arbitration proceedings can continue independently, even when some aspects of the subject matter are under criminal investigation.
The court noted that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited and must be exercised sparingly. Though courts can review orders passed in arbitral proceedings, such interference is justified only in exceptional cases where glaring perversity is evident. The Supreme Court in Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC (2020) held that Article 227 cannot be used to bypass the arbitration framework and should be invoked only in rare circumstances. It further observed that merely alleging fraud does not render a dispute non-arbitrable. In A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam (2016), the Supreme Court distinguished between simple and serious allegations of fraud, holding that only serious allegations—those affecting the validity of the arbitration agreement itself—would bar arbitration.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 715
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja has held that if a proper application is filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court must refer the parties to arbitration and may reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) as barred by law. However, if no such application is filed and no prayer is made for reference to arbitration, the mere existence of an arbitration clause is not sufficient to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. (2011) laid down a five-factor test for courts to determine whether to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. These include confirming the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, whether all parties to the suit are parties to the agreement, if the disputes fall within the agreement’s scope, and whether the application under Section 8 was made before the first statement on the substance of the dispute. Section 8 mandates referral to arbitration unless the court finds no valid agreement exists.
Case Title: M/s MAHAVIR PRASAD GUPTA AND SONS versus GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 716
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Tejas Karia and Justice Vibhu Bakhru has held that a party that unilaterally appoints an arbitrator is not prohibited from challenging the award on the ground that it violates Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration Act. Mere exercise of the power to make such an appointment does not constitute an express written waiver as required under the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.
The court noted that unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by one party is impermissible under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, read with the Seventh Schedule, as it raises justifiable doubts regarding the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality. Such an appointment is void ab initio, and any award passed by an ineligible arbitrator is unenforceable in law.
It further observed that Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act overrides Section 4 and requires an express written waiver to validate an otherwise ineligible arbitrator’s appointment. Waiver by conduct or participation is not sufficient. The Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband held such ineligibility is de jure, and the arbitrator’s mandate terminates automatically under Section 14(1)(a).Consenting to the extension of the mandate of the arbitrator under Section 29A(3) of the Act does not constitute a valid express waiver in writing as required under the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act.
Case Title: INDRAPRASTHA GAS LIMITED versus M/S CHINTAMANI FOOD AND SNACKS
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 683
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that contentions regarding the applicability and relevance of an arbitration agreement are to be dealt with by the arbitrator and cannot be gone into at the stage of section 11 petition. Once the existence of arbitration agreement is not disputed, any dispute related to the applicability of the agreement has to be dealt by the arbitrator. Further, the court observed that the arbitration agreement between the parties contemplates that the appointment of the sole Arbitrator shall be made out of a panel of three persons chosen by the petitioner. This appointment procedure is no longer valid in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification Vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company (2024). It is held that it is incumbent on the court to appoint an independent sole arbitrator.
Case Title: R. SANTOSH versus ONE97 COMMUNICATIONS LTD
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 688
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Shalinder Kaur and Navin Chawla has held that once the right to file a written statement is closed, an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking reference to arbitration is not maintainable.
The court noted that the Respondent supported its claim through PW-1’s affidavit and documentary evidence, including the Ticketing Agreement , Addendum Agreement and statement of accounts, and the termination notice. The Appellant did not cross-examine PW-1 on 12.12.2023, thus failing to contest either the testimony or the documents. This unchallenged evidence is deemed proved, indicating the absence of any credible defence by the Appellant.
Case Title: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. JSIW Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 692
The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Tejas Karia has held that when the language of the contract is plain, clear and unambiguous, recourse to internal aids of interpretation or extraneous materials such as negotiations and correspondence is impermissible. “Ignoring an explicit clause of the contract or acting contrary to the terms of the contract amounts to patent illegality.”, the court held.
The Court further observed that when the language of Clause 3.4.1.5 of the GCC was plain, clear and unambiguous, the internal aid of interpretation was impermissible. It held that the arbitral tribunal wrongly relied on negotiations and correspondence that were explicitly excluded by the contract. “Ignoring an explicit clause of the contract or acting contrary to the terms of the contract amounts to patent illegality”, the Court held.
Gauhati High Court
Case Title: M/S DRUCKGRAFEN INDIA LIMITED VERSUS THE STATE OF NAGALAND AND 2 ORS
Case Number: Arb.P./4/2024
The Gauhati High Court bench of Justice Yarenjungla Longkumer has held that if an arbitrator is not appointed within 30 days of the demand by the other party, the right to appoint is not automatically forfeited. However, such appointment must be made after the 30-day period but before the other party files an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
This is a petition under Sections 11(5) and 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an arbitrator. The petitioner entered into an agreement dated 01.01.1997 with the Government of Nagaland for printing lottery tickets.
Gujarat High Court
Case Title: YASH TEXTILES Versus VINAYAK FASHIONS
Case Number: R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2507 of 2017
The Gujarat High Court bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray and has held that Once the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 application—having been filed beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) and its proviso—any finding on the validity of the arbitral award as void ab initio was without legal authority. Entertaining a time-barred application under Section 34 was a grave error of law on the part of the learned Court. It further said that the respondent argued that the award was a nullity due to the absence of an arbitration agreement and the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator by the Surat Adatiya Kapda Association without their consent. However, these contentions regarding the validity of the arbitral process cannot be entertained because the Section 34 application challenging the award was filed beyond the statutory time limit and is thus barred by limitation.
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Case Title: National Highway Authority of India. Versus Jagroop Singh & Ors.
Case Number: OMPM No.55 of 2025 in Arbitration Appeal No.87 of 2025
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) does not apply to a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Therefore, if the petition is not filed within the prescribed period as laid down under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, the delay cannot be condoned.
The court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 34(3), such an application must be made within three months, extendable by only thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The court further opined that the phrase “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act clearly bars any extension beyond thirty days as held by the Supreme Court in My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/s. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd (2025).
Case Title: Gopinder Singh and Ors. Versus The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Competent Authority (SLAU) and Another.
Case Number: 2025:HHC:6238
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Ranjan Sharma has held that the mandate of the Arbitrator can be extended under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) if the arbitral proceedings are not completed within 12 months due to reasons not attributable to the petitioner, as failing to do so would cause grave prejudice to the petitioner. It further added that though, the arbitral proceedings under Section 29A(1) and Section 29A(3) are to be completed within 18 months period yet in case due to unforeseen eventualities the arbitral proceedings are not completed within 18 months, then the law-makers were conscious enough by prescribing a remedy under Section 29A(5), for extending the period of arbitral proceedings, only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions, as may be imposed by the Court.
Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
Case-Title: Chief Engineer PW(R&B) Department and another vs M/s Abdul Salam Mir
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 131
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that since the delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award was the mandatory requirement under the arbitration act therefore, the limitation for challenging the said award would arise only after the said signed copy is received by the party seeking to challenge the same.
A bench of Justices Sanjay Dhar observed that there is a distinction between making of award and delivering an award. The court added that making an award refers to the period when a Tribunal finalizes its decision between the parties which is deemed to be made when it is signed by the arbitrator while as Delivering of an award refers to formal handing over of the signed award to the parties in terms of Section 31 (5) of the Act.
Case Title: GHULAM RASOOL BHAT Vs. SHAFEEQ FRUIT COMPANY
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 181
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar has held that the court, while referring parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), cannot direct that the award, passed after the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, be filed before it.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in K. K. Modi vs. K. N. Modi, (1998) held that For an agreement to be considered an arbitration agreement, it must fulfill certain essential criteria. First, it must contemplate that the decision of the arbitral tribunal will be binding on the parties. Second, the tribunal’s jurisdiction must arise from the consent of the parties, a court order, or a statute that clearly designates the process as arbitration.
Case-Title: Tarmat Ltd. Vs Union of India and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 247
In an order addressing the long-pending stalemate in an arbitration matter, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court directed the Union of India to deposit the arbitrator’s fee as per the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, enabling the pronouncement of the arbitral award. The issue before the court was whether a government-prescribed internal fee structure for empanelled arbitrators could override the statutory fee scale in the Fourth Schedule of the 1996 Act. The Court directed the Union of India to deposit its share of the arbitrator’s fee with the Registrar Judicial, Jammu within 30 days, to be kept in a fixed deposit, without prejudice to its right to contest the claim in appropriate proceedings later.
Jharkhand High Court
Case Title – M/s Bodhraj Construction v. Snehanshu Sinha
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 27
The Jharkhand High Court Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao has observed that ‘competent authority’ within the meaning of Section 3(l) of the Jharkhand Apartment (Flat) Owners Act, 2011 is an executive authority and not a quasi-judicial or judicial authority. Accordingly, pendency of some proceedings under the said Act would not preclude the court from appointing an arbitrator if there is a valid arbitration clause between the parties.
The Court observed that Section 3(l) of the 2011 Act defined “competent authority” as an officer or authority who or which may be vested by the State Government by a notification in the official gazette with “executive powers” to perform duties and function of the competent authority and for implementing the provisions of the 2011 Act and the rules made there under for such areas as may be specified in the notification under general guidance, superintendence and control of the State Government. Thus, what power is conferred on the “competent authority” under 2011 Act is only an executive power and not a judicial power and therefore, he is not a judicial authority. The Court noted that while Section 21 of the 2011 Act conferred certain powers on the competent authority to impose a penalty in some cases, but this power is not a judicial power as he is not required to adjudicate anything and he only exercises an executive power akin to that exercised under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.
Case Title: C.I.S.C.-S.R.S.C. (Joint Venture) Versus Central Coalfields Limited
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 40
The Jharkhand High Court bench of Chief Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao and Justice Deepak Roshan has held that interest at the default rate of 18% under unamended Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be claimed when the arbitral proceedings commenced before the 2015 amendment and the parties have not agreed to apply the amended provision. In such cases, the unamended provision applies, and only the interest specified in the award is payable. The default rate of 18% applies only if the award is silent on interest component.
Case Title: Ranchi Municipal Corporation Versus M/s A2Z Waste Management (Ranchi) Limited
Case Title: I.A. No. 12521 of 2024 In/and Commercial Appeal No. 16 of 2024 and Commercial Appeal No. 16 of 2024
The Jharkhand High Court bench of Chief Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao and Justice Rajesh Shankar has held that when two claims decided in an arbitral award are mutually unrelated, the court, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), cannot set aside the entire arbitral award solely because a fraud was committed concerning one of the claims, while the other claims are based on entirely different reasoning and grounds.
The court at the outset noted that the arbitral tribunal found that the non-payment of the tipping fee for December 2013 and the delay in payments from April to August 2011 constituted a breach of contract by the RMC. However, the claim regarding the ‘supply of vehicles’ was unrelated to the ‘non-payment of the tipping fee’ and was rejected by the tribunal due to fraud.
Based on the above, it held that when the claims are unrelated to each other, on the basis of a fraud with regard to the claim regarding procurement of vehicles, the Commercial Court could not have interfered with the arbitral award with regard to the award of the claim to the Contractor regarding tipping fee.
Karnataka High Court
Case Title: M/S. MAHA RASHTRA APEX CORPORATION LTD Versus SRI. P.K.MOHAMMED and Ors.
Case Number:MFA No. 11925 of 2012
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice Hanchate Sanjeevkumar has held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be decided without first summoning the entire arbitration record to determine whether the notice was actually served on the other party.
Case Title:The Union Of India and Anr. Versus Sri. Kothari Subbaraju
Case Number: MFA No. 6525 Of 2016
The Karnataka High Court bench of Mr Justice Hanchate Sanjeevkumar has held that the District Judge, while deciding a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), is not empowered to increase the amount awarded by the Arbitrator. The findings of the Arbitrator with respect to the awarded amount can only be set aside if they contravene any of the grounds specified under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act; however, the awarded amount cannot be either decreased or increased.
The court at the outset observed that the District Judge is not an appellate authority for the purpose of deciding the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act therefore it cannot modify the arbitral award. The award can only be set aside on the limited grounds specified under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court in S.V.Samudram (supra) has categorically held that a court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, has no jurisdiction to modify an arbitral award. If the award conflicts with any of the grounds mentioned under Section 34, it may be set aside, but cannot be altered or modified. Any attempt to modify it would amount to “crossing the Lakshman Rekha.”
Case Title: NEIL PATEL DIGITAL LLC Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR RAJARATHINAM
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 160
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj has passed ex-parte injunctions under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in favour of Neil Patel Digital LLC (“NPD LLC”).
The disputes had arisen from breach of the covenants of a Limited Liability Partnership Agreement. The LLP Agreement contained various negative covenants restricting the Respondent No. 1 in respect of, among other things, transfer of funds beyond stipulated limits, appointment of key managerial personnel, induction of partners, etc.. Alleged violations of these covenants by the Respondent No. 1, including suspicious transactions, gave rise to disputes inter se the parties.
Case Title: N. H. Gowda Versus Mr. Rangarama And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 179
The Karnataka High Court bench of Chief Justice N. V. Anjaria and Justice K. V. Aravind has held that when both parties have agreed to resolve their disputes regarding the nature of the partnership through arbitration, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the partnership is one “at will.” Such issues are more appropriately left for adjudication by the arbitrator. The court further said that while directing the parties to resolve their dispute through arbitration, the interim arrangement ordered by the Commercial Court cannot be sustained without modification. The existing arrangement is impractical and disproportionately affects the interests of both parties, potentially leading to further litigation.
Case Title: Smt. Manjula & Anr. vs. Shriram Transport Finance Co Ltd & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 199
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj has held that a person who is the named Arbitrator in a notice issued under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot enter reference and pass orders without the other person consenting thereto or without an order of appointment of Arbitrator by institution or a Court under Section 11 of the Act.
The Court noted that neither party placed the arbitration agreement on record. When there was no agreement available on record to indicate the existence or otherwise of an arbitration clause, the question of Shriram relying upon arbitration clause would not arise. Even assuming the arbitration agreement existed, the Court noted that the said clause did not indicate a named Arbitrator. Shriram had issued a notice dated 27-07-2019 nominating Respondent No. 2 as arbitrator. The Court found that there was no consent which was expressed by the Petitioners to the appointment of Respondent No. 2 as the sole Arbitrator. It held that the appointment of the 2nd Respondent as an Arbitrator by Shriram was unilateral and thus not permissible, and the orders passed by the arbitrator were non est.
Kerala High Court
Case Title:THE STATE OF KERALA VERSUS S. AJAYAKUMAR AND ORS.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 368
The Kerela High Court bench of Justice Syam Kumar V.M. and Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari has held that when the payment due to the petitioner was made by the respondent pursuant to a court order explicitly directing it as full and final settlement of all liabilities, and the petitioner also issued a letter accepting the same, he cannot subsequently claim that the letter was issued under duress or out of necessity.
The court noted that The petitioner’s writ petition concerned claims under five construction contracts, alleging breach by the respondents. Earlier writ petitions on the same subject were dismissed by this Court on the ground that disputed questions of fact were involved, which required adjudication through civil remedies, not under Article 226. Subsequent writ appeals were also dismissed. Despite this, the petitioner filed the present W.P.(C), seeking directions for payment under Exts. P6 and P10 ‘awards’.
Case Title: M.I. Mohammed v. M/s. HLL Life Care Ltd. & Ors. Case Number: AR No. 95 of 2025
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice M.A. Abdul Hakhim has held that where an arbitral award is set aside on the ground that the appointment of the arbitrator was void ab initio and the arbitral proceedings are declared non est, the new arbitrator must initiate proceedings afresh. The question of admissibility of previously recorded evidence is to be decided by the new arbitrator.
Case Title: M.I. MOHAMMED versus M/S. HLL LIFE CARE LTD.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 227
The Kerela High Court Bench of Justice Basant Balaji has held that once the arbitration has commenced, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act, even at an earlier stage.
The court held that the petitioner’s recourse to an Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is improper, and that the sole remedy lies in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act. The court also relied on the judgment in SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering (2005), wherein the court has held that when the remedy to challenge the order of arbitrator is available under the Act, then filing of writ is disapproved.
Case Title: Flemingo (DFS) Private Limited Versus Airports Authority Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 246
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice Harisankar V. Menon has held that a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India can be entertained against an order passed by the Commercial Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) when such an order neither grants nor refuses to grant relief, thereby not making it appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Case Title: M/S BANMORE ELECTRICALS PVT LTD THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR NIRMAL KUMAR JAIN Versus MADHYA PRADESH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED
Case Number: REVIEW PETITION No. 754 of 2025
The Madhya Pradesh High Court Bench of Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke has held that repetition of old and overruled arguments is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications as the review proceedings under Order 47 Rule 1 r/w Section 114 of CPC challenging an arbitration order cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. The scope of review is very limited.
Case Title: M/S TRICON ENERGY UK LIMITED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR. SANTOSH KOLI Vs M/S KRITI INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LIMITED
Case Number: AC No. 60 of 2024
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar has held that an ex parte order may be recalled when the concerned party appears later, complies with the court’s directions, and the matter involves complex legal issues requiring a fair hearing from both sides for an effective adjudication.
The court observed that although the non-applicant was initially proceeded ex-parte, they later appeared, filed detailed objections on maintainability, and complied with the Court’s direction to deposit the amount and provide security. Given the complex legal issues involved and in the interest of justice, it was held that the non-applicant should be heard before making the order dated 15.07.2024 absolute, albeit with appropriate costs for initial negligence.
Madras High Court
Case Title: M/s. Unique Builders Vs The Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 17
The Madras High Court bench of Justice P.B. Balaji has held that inordinate and unexplained delay in passing the arbitral award can be a ground to set it aside under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The primary question before the court was whether an arbitral award can be set aside on the ground that a significant time was taken by the Arbitrator in passing the award. The court noted that in Harji Engineering Works Private Limited v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, (2009) the Delhi High Court while referring to the UNCITRAL guide held that arbitration aims to provide speedy justice and a substantial delay in passing the award would lead to the Arbitrator forgetting the crucial facts. An unexplained delay in passing the award could render the award contrary to public policy.
Case Title: M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited vs. S.M. Thangaraj & Ors.
Case Number: C.R.P.No. 5197 of 2024
The Madras High Court bench of Justice N. Sathish Kumar has observed that the issue of ineligibility of the arbitrator cannot be raised during the pendency of the execution proceedings. The court held that the Executing Courts cannot suo motu dismiss the Execution Petition(s) solely on the ground of unilateral appointment of an arbitrator.
The court held that the executing court cannot suo motu annul the award when a party to the agreement did not challenge the award on the ground of ineligibility of the arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. “As long as there is no objection raised, it cannot be said that a mere unilateral appointment of arbitrator would vitiate the entire arbitral proceedings which culminated in an award”, the court stated.
Case Title:M/s.Chennai Metro Rail Limited Vs Transtonnelstroy Limited
Case Number: OP Nos. 530 & 531 of 2017 & A.No.3818 of 2017
The Madras High Court bench of Justice P.B. Balaji has held that when the view taken by the Arbitrator is not even a plausible view, an award passed by such an arbitrator can be set aside under section 34 of the Arbitration act on the ground of patent illegality.
The court noted that a plain reading of clause 13.16.5 shows that when price variation formula in CPA 32 is adopted, then the respondents cannot be entitled to claim any additional costs, unless there is a claim falling under the three exceptions, namely customs duty, excise duty and output TN VAT which also is again subject to the rider that it will be paid to the extent that it is not covered by the price variation formula. It further added that “the Tribunal has misread the clauses and erroneously proceeded to hold that clause 13.16 of GCC entitles the respondent for price adjustment because of change in legislation after the base date. However, the express modifications made by CPA 37, replacing sub clause 13.16 of GCC have not been factored or looked into by the Tribunal.”
Orissa High Court
Case Title: M/s Odisha Mining Corporation Limited Versus Union of India, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and Ors.
Case Number:W.P.(C) No.22236 OF 2014
The Orissa High Court bench of Justice K.R. Mohapatra has held that once the MSME Council initiates arbitration following the termination of conciliation proceedings, any order passed by the Council regarding its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute can only be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The aggrieved party cannot invoke Article 227 of the Constitution to seek setting aside of an award passed under the MSMED Act.
While referring to various judgments, the court held that in Kanwar Singh Saini, it was held that when a statute creates a right and prescribes a specific forum for its enforcement, the remedy must be sought only under that statute. Similarly, in M/s Silpi Industries, the Supreme Court clarified that the MSMED Act, being a special legislation, overrides the Arbitration Act.
It further added that if the claim falls under the MSMED Act, the supplier may approach the designated authority, and any agreement to the contrary is void. The same view was echoed by the Allahabad High Court in Marsons Electrical Industries, stating that MSMED registration applies prospectively and cannot be given retrospective effect. Accordingly, Clause 9.20 of the contract, providing for jurisdiction, stands overridden by the MSMED Act.
Patna High Court
Case Title: M/s R.S. Contruction Versus Building Construction Department
Case Number: REQUEST CASE No.105 of 2024
The Patna High Court Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators.
The court relied on the judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company (2019) and held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators. Finally, the court rejected the request case.
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Case Title: Dalbir Singh and Another Dalbir Singh and Another Versus M/s Krisam Properties Private Limited
Case Number:CR-5999-2022(O&M)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justice Vikram Aggarwal has held that a dispute concerning the mutation of land arising from a Memorandum of Settlement entered into between the parties containing an arbitration clause is considered a dispute in personam especially when it does not affect third-party rights. Such disputes are arbitrable and should be referred to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in ‘Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. Vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Others’ held that when a suit is filed by a party to an arbitration agreement against the other parties, and an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is filed, the court must consider five key questions: (i) whether an arbitration agreement exists among the parties; (ii) whether all parties to the suit are parties to the arbitration agreement.
Case Title: Parsvnath Developers Limited vs. Brig. Devendra Singh Yadav and others
Case Number: FAO-CARB-28-2022(O&M)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench comprising of Justice Arun Palli and Justice Vikram Aggarwal has held that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Act read with Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is not maintainable against an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC directing the return of a petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for presentation to the appropriate court.
Sikkim High Court
Case Title: Union of India M/s Valecha Shivalaya – Interdril (JV)
Case Title: Arb. A. No. 03 of 2024
The Sikkim High Court bench of Justices Bhaskar Raj Pradhan and Biswanath Somadderhas held that section 29A, as amended by the 2019 Amendment, shall apply to all arbitration proceedings that were pending at the time the amendment came into force.
The court at the outset observed that upon examining the communication dated 07.02.2023, it is evident that the respondent, despite adding a caveat, consented to extend the arbitration period, stating the extension was granted in anticipation of a lawful award.
It further observed that under Section 29A(3) of the Arbitration Act, parties may extend the time to make an award by up to six months. Assuming 27.01.2022 as the date of completion of pleadings, the initial 12-month period under Section 29A(1) would end around 26.01.2023. The respondent’s consent on 07.02.2023 would validly extend the time until approximately 26.07.2023. Hence, the award dated 23.02.2023 falls within the permissible period and is not time-barred.
Rajasthan High Court
Case Title: Rajasthan Urban Infrastructures Development Project Versus M/s National Builders
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 176
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Bhuwan Goyal has held that the imposition of liquidated damages by a party primarily responsible for the delay in completion of the work is unjustified. Therefore, the arbitrator’s direction to refund such damages cannot be interfered with, given the limited scope of appellate intervention under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpo ration Limited & Anr. vs. M/s Sanman Rice Mills & Ors.(2024) held that the role of the Appellate court under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is not to determine whether the arbitral tribunal’s decision is right or wrong, but merely to ensure that the decision under Section 34 was rendered within the statutory framework. The appellate court may interfere only if the court under Section 34 either overstepped its jurisdiction or failed to exercise it altogether. This supervisory power is comparable to the revisional jurisdiction of civil courts.
Case Title:Sunil Kumar Bhakoo Versus Smt. Varisha
Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.2157/2024
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Bhuwan Goyal has held that when a court, in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) finds that the agreement to sell, on which the arbitration was initiated, is insufficiently stamped, it must provide the party an opportunity to cure the defect by impounding the instrument. The court cannot set aside the arbitral award on the ground that the agreement was invalid due to insufficient stamping. The court further observed that section 35 of the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument must be duly stamped to be admissible in evidence, registered, or authenticated. Proviso (a) allows admissibility upon payment of the due stamp duty and penalty.
Case Title: Javed Mohammad and Anr. Versus Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 173
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Bhuwan Goyal has held that when the delivery of the arbitral award at the registered address is not disputed, the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act cannot be suspended on the ground that the appellant became aware of the award at a later date. The limitation period must be computed from the date of receipt of the award, not from the date of knowledge.
The court noted that when specifically queried during the hearing, learned counsel for the appellants was unable to point out any pleading asserting that the recipient of the award, one Haseena, was unrelated to the appellants or was not residing at the stated address. Therefore, it held that the appellants’ contention that limitation begins from the date of knowledge cannot be accepted in the absence of any evidence disputing proper delivery of the award.
Case Title: The State of Rajasthan, through District Collector Pali. & Ors. vs. Sanwariya Infrastructure Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 195
The Rajasthan High Court bench comprising Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Bhuwan Goyal have held that an arbitral award which grants reliefs beyond the express terms of the contract, including compensation for losses and interest where no such entitlement exists under the agreement, is patently illegal and liable to be set aside under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court observed that as per the Agreement, the concession period of 70 months was to commence from the “Commencement Date”, which was defined as the date on which the “physical possession of the Project site is delivered by GOR to the concessionaire”. Therefore, the commencement date could only be reckoned from the date of entire possession of the project site and not partial possession.
Title: Shekharchand Sacheti & Anr. v S.M.F.G. India Home Finance Company Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 205
Rajasthan High Court ruled that since the respondent was already aware of and was not taken by surprise regarding petitioner’s invocation of arbitration clause, their plea that the application for appointment of arbitrator was not maintainable since no notice was served under Section 21 of the A&C Act 1996, lacked merit.
The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand also reiterated the principle laid down in the case of M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited & others v. Hero Fincorp Limited that the SARFAESI Proceedings were in the nature of enforcement while arbitration was an adjudicatory proceedings. Hence, both could proceed parallel.
The Court was hearing an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The applicants had obtained loan from the respondent by mortgaging a 6318 sq ft of a 12000 sq ft. property under an agreement that had an arbitration clause. Applicant’s loan account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset and proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were initiated against them.
Telangana High Court
Case Title: MS Cipher Oncology Private Limited vs M S Unimed Health Care Private Limited
Case Number: ARBITRATION APPLICATION No.163 of 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul has held that unless a proper notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), suggesting the name of the proposed arbitrator, is sent to the other party, the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Merely demanding outstanding payment without proposing the name of an arbitrator cannot be construed as a valid invocation of the arbitration clause for the purposes of Section 21 of the Arbitration Act.
The Delhi High Court in Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited v. Narender Singh (2024) held that it is necessary for the party making an appointment to inform the other party in advance of the name of the proposed arbitrator to ensure the person’s suitability and qualifications under the Arbitration Act. The court in the above case also held that this notice enables both parties to reach a consensus on the appointment. Unless such notice commencing arbitral proceedings is issued, a party cannot proceed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Based on the above, the court held that in the present case, admittedly, the applicant’s notice is not relating to a demand for appointment of an arbitrator, although it suggests so in the clause of ‘subject’.
Case Title: Smt Somuri Ravali Versus Somuri Purnachandra Rao
Case Number: CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.739 of 2025
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R.Madhusudhan Rao has held that when an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) in a domestic arbitration, the mandate of the arbitrator can be extended by the High Court only under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act and not by any other courts inferior to the High Court.
The court observed that It is evident from Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act that the term “Court” includes the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district as well as the jurisdictional High Court. The provision does not contain any language excluding the High Court from arbitrations under Part I of the Act, i.e., domestic arbitrations. The court further opined that Section 2(1)(e) read with Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act is hierarchy-sensitive in determining the competent court for matters related to appointment, termination, and extension of an arbitrator’s mandate.
Case Title: M S NCC Limited vs M S Elecon Epc Projects Limited
Case Number:COMCA No.29 of 2022
The Telangana High Court bench of Justices Moushumi Bhattacharya and B.R.Madhusudhan Rao has held that loss of profit incurred by a party due to the other party’s suppression of material facts regarding the termination of the contract, where the former continued to render services under a mistaken belief, can be reasonably compensated by applying the Hudson formula.
The court at the outset noted that the Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not define the word ‘breach’ as a standalone act or omission. Sections 73 and 74 of the Act ensure compensation as a consequence of breach. It further observed that section 37 of the Act clarifies a pre-breach situation by declaring that the parties to a contract must either perform or offer to perform their respective promises unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of the Act or under any other law.
The Telangana High Court has clarified that section 47 of the CPC, which permits objections to be raised in an execution petition before the Trial Court; cannot be used as an alternative to challenge an arbitration award, which is being executed before a Trial Court.
The Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, while passing the order made it clear that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a Code in itself and lays down a mechanism to challenge an award under section 37, by way of an appeal. The Bench further clarified that merely because the Arbitration and Conciliation stipulates that an award should be enforced in accordance with CPC, it does not ipso facto mean that all provisions of CPC will be attracted to an award that is sought to be executed.
Case Title: Danieli India Limited vs Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited
Case Number: ARBITRATION APPLICATION No.266 OF 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K Lakshman has held that even if the designated arbitral institution named in the arbitration agreement no longer exists, the Court can still appoint a new arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) provided the intention to arbitrate is clearly evident from the arbitration clause.
Case Title: M/s GRN Constructions Private Limited vs The Singareni Collieries Company Limited
Case Number: ARBITRATION APPLICATON No.276 OF 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K. Lakshman has held that in a scenario where the referral court can discern the frivolity of the dispute from the bare minimum pleadings, it would be incorrect to presume that the arbitral tribunal, equipped to undertake a detailed examination of the pleadings and evidence, would be unable to reach the same conclusion. Therefore, it is better that the plea of limitation should be left to be decided by the Arbitrator.
The court at the outset observed that it is relevant to note that following the amendment to the Arbitration Act effective from 23.10.2015, and in light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, this Court, acting as the referral court under Section 11 of the Act, is bound to refer the matter to arbitration unless the dispute is manifestly non-arbitrable.
Case Title:Dr. S. Abhilash vs Prasanth Busareddy
Case Number: CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.692 of 2023
The Telangana High Court bench of Sri Justice P. Sam Koshy and Sri Justice N. Tukaramji has held that when a party, in its reply to a Section 8 petition under the Arbitration Act, has expressly denied the existence or validity of the agreements containing the arbitration clause by terming them null and void, such agreements cannot subsequently be relied upon by the same party as the basis to seek reference of the disputes to arbitration.
The court at the outset noted that Section 8 of the Arbitration Act mandates that a judicial authority must refer parties to arbitration if there exists a valid arbitration agreement and one of the parties applies for reference before submitting their first substantive statement. To determine the existence of such an agreement, Section 7 becomes relevant. It defines an arbitration agreement as a written agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, either as a clause in a contract or a separate agreement.
Case Title: Ch. Punyamurthy vs Union of India
Case Number: ARBITRATION APPLICATION No.180 OF 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K Lakshman has held that mere passage of time does not bar arbitration if the arbitration clause remains valid. The Limitation for the purpose of filing the application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act commences from the date when request for initiating arbitration is rejected. It further observed that in Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the limitation period for initiating arbitration commences from the date of rejection of the arbitration request. As the respondents rejected the applicant’s request on 25.07.2022, the present petition is well within the limitation period.
Case Title: M/S V.K.A. Constructions vs The State of Telangana
Case Number: WRIT PETITION No.956 OF 2025
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K. Lakshman has held that the question of whether a particular contract is a works contract or not is for the MSME Council to decide, and the dispute cannot be decided under writ jurisdiction.
The court noted that in National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft (2007) the Supreme Court held that if the arbitral tribunal decides its jurisdiction under Section 16 and holds that it has no jurisdiction, then such order is appealable.
Case Title: Urbanwoods Realty LLP vs Mrs. Uma Rastogi & Another
Case Number: ARBITRATION APPLICATION No.41 OF 2023
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K. Lakshman has held that in case of interconnected agreements, where the mother agreement clearly and unequivocally refers the disputes to arbitration, mere use of ‘may’ in the arbitration clause of one of the ancillary agreements will not defeat the intention to arbitrate.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re held that the Referral Court at Section 11 stage should not examine or impound an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument, but rather leave it for the determination by the Arbitral Tribunal. Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal. It further noted that in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning the Supreme Court held that with the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the doctrine of separability was expressly recognized.
Case Title: M/s Excel Constructions vs M/s Bharat Biotech International Ltd
Case Number: I.A.NO.1 OF 2025 IN/AND CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.1620 OF 2025
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Raohas has held that the award holder can be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by the award debtor in pursuance of stay on the execution of the award. The award holder cannot be prohibited from withdrawing the amount only on the ground that the award debtor may succeed in the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
It further noted that as it stands, the Award-holder has not received the benefit of the Award dated 19.09.2017, even after nearly 8 years, due to the stay on its execution. Despite the respondent depositing ₹1,18,50,000 (50% of the Award amount), the Award-holder has not been allowed to withdraw any portion of it. The court further observed that the Award-holder now seeks permission to withdraw ₹59,25,000 (25% of the Award amount) and is willing to furnish security for the remaining 25%, effectively seeking access to only half of the deposited amount while securing the balance.
Case Title: PCL Intertech Lenhydro Consortium vs Punjab National Bank
Case Number: Arbitration Application No.49 of 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice N.V. Shravan Kumar has held that when the mandate of an arbitrator terminates under Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, a substitute arbitrator must be appointed in accordance with the original procedure agreed upon by the parties. In such cases, the court cannot appoint a new arbitrator under Section 11, as the appropriate course is to appoint a substitute following the mechanism under Section 15(2), not initiate a fresh appointment process.
The court noted that in the Applicant’s letter dated 19.06.2020, the Bank was informed that the purpose of the Escrow Agreement had been fulfilled and was requested to take necessary steps to prevent further unintended transactions, along with submitting transaction details for record-keeping.
It further added that however, the letter contained no explicit direction to close the Escrow Account. In contrast, Respondent No.3’s letter dated 25.06.2020 clearly instructed closure of the account, citing fulfillment of purpose and requesting termination of the Escrow Agreement under Clause 13.3.
Case Title: M/S Shriram Life Insurance Company Ltd. vs Mr. Sahil Khan
Case Number: ARBITRATION APPLICATION NOs.182 AND 199 OF 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K. Lakshman has held that a substitute arbitrator must generally be appointed in the same mode and manner as the original arbitrator. When the appointment of an earlier arbitrator was done under a defective arbitration clause or an unlawful procedure was followed, in such cases a proper recourse is to seek appointment of a new arbitrator under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning held that in light of the Supreme Court’s observations in In Re: Interplay, the Court clarified that at the stage of appointing an arbitrator, the scope of inquiry is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Therefore, the broader jurisdiction recognized in Vidya Drolia and NTPC v. SPML—allowing referral courts to reject ex facie non-arbitrable or frivolous disputes—cannot be said to continue post In Re: Interplay.