SC: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia’s retirement
“Language is not religion. Language does not even represent religion. Language belongs to a community, to a region, to people; and not to a religion. Language is culture. Language is the yardstick to measure the civilizational march of a community and its people”.1
: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia
Born in a family of freedom fighters and jurists, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, a second-generation legal professional, carved his niche in the judicial echelons. Starting his career in 1986 in Allahabad, Justice Dhulia’s career took flight and eventually led to his appointment as Senior Advocate, Standing Counsel and thereafter as Judge of High Courts and then Supreme Court.
After a dedicated tenure of 3-years as Judge of the Supreme Court, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia is now ready to bid adieu to the Top Court’s hallow halls. To understand the impact that Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia left on the legal fraternity, it is only proper that we travel back in time to trace his life and career and eventually take a look at some his most notable decisions as a Judge.
Early Life
Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was born on 10-08-1960 in in Pauri Garhwal, Uttarakhand to Keshav Chandra Dhulia, who was also a Judge at Allahabad High Court and Sumitra Dhulia, a Sanskrit Professor.2 His grandfather, Pundit Bhairav Dutt Dhulia, was a freedom fighter who sentenced to jail for seven years (severed for three years and later was released) for participating in the Quit India Movement.3 He has two brothers – the elder Himanshu Dhulia, a retired naval officer, and the younger Tigmanshu Dhulia is a filmmaker.4
*Did You Know? Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia is the elder brother of National Award-winning film director and actor Tigmanshu Dhulia.5
Educational Background
His early years were characterized by a diverse educational experience that laid the foundation for his later achievements. He did his earlier schooling from Dehradun, Allahabad and Lucknow. He graduated from Allahabad University in 1981 and completed his Masters in Modern History in 1983. Justice Dhulia completed his L.L.B. in 1986.6
Career as an Advocate
Justice Dhulia is a second-generation legal professional and joined the Bar at Allahabad High Court in 1986. Initially, his legal practice revolved around the Civil and Constitutional aspects of the law before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. As the legal landscape evolved, he transitioned his practice to the newly established High Court of the State of Uttarakhand, situated in the serene city of Nainital.7 He was designated as Senior Advocate in June, 2004 at High Court of Uttarakhand.8
After the creation the State of Uttarakhand, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia became its First Chief Standing Counsel and was later appointed as State Additional Advocate General.9
Judicial Journey
Justice Dhulia was elevated as a Permanent Judge of Uttarakhand High Court on 01-11-2008.10 He was also appointed as the Judge in-Charge of education at the Uttarakhand Judicial and Legal Academy. He was elevated as Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court on 07-01-202111 and took the oath on 10-01-2021.
The pinnacle of Justice Dhulia’s career was his elevation as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India on 07-05-2022.12 His journey from his early schooling days to the present esteemed position is a testament to the power of knowledge, dedication, and the pursuit of justice.
*Did You Know? Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia is the second Judge to be elevated from Uttarakhand High Court to the Supreme Court.13
Notable Judgements
*Did you Know? During his 3-year tenure at the Supreme Court, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia authored over 70 Judgments and was part of over 600 decisions14.
The Nine-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud, Hrishikesh Roy, B.V. Nagarathna, Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ., delivered its judgment on the issue of whether private resources form part of the ‘material resource of the community’ under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The majority judgment delivered by CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud by the ratio of 7:2 held that all the ‘private properties’ cannot form part of the ‘material resources of the community’ under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The Court unanimously held that Article 31-C of the Constitution to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 remains in force.
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.* agreed with the majority on the view taken on Article 31-C, however, he dissented from the majority view on aspect of Article 39(b). He stated that there should be no confusion that the expression “material resources of the community” used in Article 39(b) includes privately owned resources. This has been the consistent view of this Court. It could not have been otherwise. To my mind a reference to material resources in Article 39(b) without privately owned resources being a part of it, does not even make any sense. “It is only when we include privately owned resources, as a part of the “material resources of the community” that the purpose of Articles 38 and 39 is fully realised. It is only then that the socialist and democratic principles incorporated in our Constitution get their true meaning.” [Property Owners Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3122]
In a significant decision, the 3-Judge Bench of Hrishikesh Roy, Sudhanshu Dhulia* and S.V.N Bhatti, JJ., while deliberating over whether residence-based reservation in Postgraduate (PG) Medical Courses by a State is constitutionally valid, held that, considering the importance of specialist doctors’ in PG Medical Course, reservation at the higher level based on ‘residence’ would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. [Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 180]
While deciding the appeal challenging Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision to uphold the selections made by the State of Punjab for the posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians in Government Degree colleges of Punjab, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., quashed the entire recruitment and directed the State to initiate the recruitment process as per the 2018 UGC Regulations which are now in force in the State of Punjab. The Court pointed out that the State miserably failed to justify the departure from the standard norms of the recruitment process and to give any valid reason for not adopting the UGC Regulations and avoiding the Public Service Commission in the recruitment in question. The Court said that quashing of the entire recruitment process may cause hardships for the selected candidates, but at the same time, there is no equity in the favour of selected candidates as challenge to the recruitment was made during the pendency of the process and appointments were subject to the Court orders. A gross illegality like the present recruitment cannot be ignored. [Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1420]
In a batch of petitions filed by opposition party leaders and several NGOs, challenging the Election Commission of India (‘ECI’) directive dated 24-06-2025, which ordered a Special Intensive Revision of the electoral rolls in Bihar., the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ. urged the ECI to consider allowing Aadhaar, ration cards, and Electoral Photo Identity Cards (‘EPICs’) as admissible documents for proving voter identity during the ongoing Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls being undertaken in Bihar ahead of the Assembly elections in November 2025. [Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1408]
While considering the instant matter, which revolved around honour killing of a young couple via administering poison in full view of a large number of villagers by the deceased girl’s father and brother; the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ., refused to interfere with the Madras High Court decision on convicting and sentencing the appellants (accused persons). The Court further awarded compensation of Rupees 5,00,000 to the deceased boy’s parents jointly, or to the nearest of their kins. This compensation is liable to be paid by the State of Tamil Nadu, and this compensation would be in addition to the amount awarded or directed to be paid as compensation by the Sessions Court and High Court. “A crime is an act against the State. But a wicked and odious crime, as the one we have just dealt with, is the ugly reality of our deeply entrenched caste structure. Honour-killing, as these are called, must get a strong measure of punishment”. [K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 958]
In the instant matter, the appellant had been aggrieved at the use of Urdu on the signboard of the new building of the Municipal Council, Patur (‘Municipal Council’) in district Akola, Maharashtra, the board of the Council displayed “Municipal Council, Patur”, in Marathi at the top, with its translation below in Urdu language. The Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., while dismissing the appeal, held that display of an additional language cannot by itself, be said to be in violation of the provisions of the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022 (‘2022 Act’) as there is no prohibition on the use of Urdu under the 2022 Act or in any provision of law. [Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 778]
While considering the instant appeal challenging the non-quashment of FIR filed by an estranged wife on the ground that she was lied about her husband’s profession; the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., opined that the FIR against the husband and his family was filed for totally extraneous reasons which should have been quashed by the Gujarat High Court. Respondent 2 (wife) married Appellant 1 (husband) on 10-04-2023 and they stayed together as husband and wife for four months. The husband had a skin disease called leukoderma. The wife lodged an FIR against the Appellants stating that she was lied about her estranged husband’s profession. It was stated that she married Appellant 1 because he was an Eye Surgeon, but he turned out to be an ‘Optometrist’ (a healthcare provider who specializes in caring for eyes, examining, diagnosing and treating diseases and disorders that affect vision) and that this fact was not known to her till 21-05-2023, the date of their wedding reception. [Rohan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1056]
In an appeal filed against the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court concerning the reservation of posts in the State of Punjab’s government services, including provisions for women’s reservation, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. emphasized that no alterations could be made to the recruitment process once the advertisement was issued and deemed it unnecessary to examine the legality of the subsequent roster system for the purpose of the case. Since neither the advertisement nor the Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020 (‘2020 Rules’) providing 33% horizontal reservation for women were challenged, the reservation stood valid. Thus, the Court concluded that once it is accepted that the Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) post in question was reserved for the ‘SC Sports (Women)’ category under Advertisement No.14 dated 11-12-2020, the appellant stood as the only eligible candidate for appointment, being the sole SC woman who had successfully qualified for the post. [Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 761]
In a set of two criminal appeals against Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision transferring the investigation to CBI of the matter wherein, the present accused was alleged of impersonating as a high-ranking police official, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision, viewing that the present case was not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. [Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 149]
In civil appeals filed by All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (‘Society’) against the order passed by the Bombay High Court, as well as the order passed in review later, wherein the Court directed the Society to extend the benefit of revised pay scales under the 6th Central Pay Commission to the teachers are presently teaching in engineering and technical institutes run and managed by the Society, which is a private body and is not under the grant in aid of the Government, the division bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. held that where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits. Thus, the Court directed that the Society to release the higher pay scale to the teachers who were appointed prior to 15-03-2000, along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum on the arrears, within four weeks from the date of this judgment. The Court further clarified that the remaining teachers who failed to acquire a Ph.D. within seven years as required, cannot be designated as Associate Professors nor be entitled to the higher pay scale. [All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 6 SCC 605]
In a criminal appeal against Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision, whereby the accused person’s application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) for quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’) was dismissed, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision opining that the High Court erred in denying the relief to the accused- former director of the corporate debtor by placing reliance upon P. Mohan Raj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258. The Court explained that cause of action under Section 138 of the NI Act arose after the commencement of the insolvency process. [Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Co., (2025) 262 Comp Cas 1]
In a criminal appeal, filed by the wife of the detenu detained under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (‘COFEPOSA Act’), challenging the order of detention, the division bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. while noting that the detaining authority had failed to consider whether the conditions imposed by the Magistrate, when granting bail for the same offence, were adequate to restrain the detenu from engaging in further smuggling activities, allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order. [Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, (2025) 4 SCC 476]
In a batch of civil appeals by the Sports Authority of India (SAI) challenging the dismissal of their recall applications by the Delhi High Court, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. held that once an employee was considered as an ‘initial constituent’ under the Sports Authority of India (Sports Sciences and Sports Medicine) Staff Recruitment Rules, 1992 (Rules), it would mean that the said person could not be treated as a contractual employee but as a regular employee, who comes under direct enrolment/control of SAI. The Court also observed that once the order had been passed on a compromise or concession given by a party, that party cannot turn back and challenge the order before a higher court, unless it is a case of fraud or deception. Such a scenario is not permissible on principle as well as on law. [Sports Authority of India v. Kulbir Singh Rana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 489]
While deciding the instant appeal by a husband and wife (appellants) aggrieved by the decision of Single Judge Bench of Calcutta High Court rejecting the appellants’ criminal revisions, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ., clarified the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287, all applications before the Court where Section 156(3), CrPC applications are made must be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. Such a step could only be prospective in nature, and this is clearly reflected from the very language used by the Judges in Priyanka Srivastava (supra). [Kanishk Sinha v. State of W.B., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 443]
In a criminal special leave petition against Rajasthan High Court’s decision whereby the petitioner’s miscellaneous petition seeking the basis of statements made by the police which allegedly humiliated her, was dismissed, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. dismissed the petition stating that during court proceedings, many statements are made and questions are posed which may make a person uncomfortable, but all such statements or questions cannot be misconstrued as humiliating a person. [Dhanlaxmi v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 300]
In a civil appeal against Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision whereby the second appeal of the respondents / defendants / donees against the decision of the Trial Court wherein, the suit property was directed to be reverted to the plaintiffs/ donor’s heir, was allowed and the concurrent decisions of the Courts below, which had decreed the suit, were set aside, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. upheld the High Court’s decision viewing that the plaintiffs had no case. While dismissing the appeal, the Court observed that perpetual service conditions without remuneration as in the gift deed are unconstitutional and amount to forced labour. [Naresh Kumari v. Chameli, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3690]
While considering the matter concerning issuing ration cards to migrant labourers, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ., directed that all such persons who are eligible/entitled for Ration Cards/ foodgrains as per the National Food Security Act, 2013 (NFSA) and have been identified as such by the respective States/Union Territories, must be issued Ration Cards before 19-11-2024. The Court also directed that such eligible labourers should be provided with foodgrains forthwith. Expressing its displeasure, the Court said that “Patience may be a virtue — but ours is nearing its end”. The Court strictly directed that the Secretaries (Food and Civil Supplies) of States where despite identification, Ration Cards have not been issued on or before 19-11.2024, shall remain present in person before the Court on the next date of hearing, to explain as to why Ration Cards have not been issued despite identification, and repeated orders in the regard. [Problems & Miseries of Migrant Labourers, In re, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2733]
In an appeal filed by Kimneo Haokip Hangshing, Member of Legislative Assembly (‘MLA’), against the order passed by Manipur High Court, wherein the Court held that whether KH Hangshing had any income or not and whether she had given a wrong declaration at the time of her nomination needs to be looked into in trial for which evidence has to be led by the parties and examined by the Court. The petition cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) application, the division bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. held that a cause of action has been disclosed by the respondent. However, the Court clarified that whether KH Hangshing has concealed her investments and her income, and thus her nomination has been improperly accepted, is a triable issue. [Kimneo Haokip Hangshing v. Kenn Raikhan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2548]
In a criminal appeal filed by the convicts against the Allahabad High Court judgment, wherein the Court upheld the conviction order of the convicts for murder over mangoes, the division bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. converted the conviction under Section 3021 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) to that of Section 3042 Part-I of IPC, and thereby converted the sentence of life imprisonment of all the convicts to that of seven years rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.25,000/- to be given by each convict within a period of eight weeks from today to the victim’s family. [Man Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1880
In a criminal appeal against conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), upheld by the Delhi High Court, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. dismissed the appeal and upheld the Trial Court’s and High Court’s decision. The Court said that both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had rightly held that the prosecution had proved their case beyond reasonable doubt, as all the evidence put together did establish the guilt of the convict. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, and the interim order dated 09-05-2012 granting bail to the convict was vacated. The Court directed the convict, on bail to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of four weeks from the date of decision. [Chandan v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 496]
In an appeal challenging Delhi High Court’s dismissal of application challenging condonation of delay for an appeal against acquittal, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, JJ. clarified that Section 378 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’) does not exclude applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. [Mohd Abaad Ali v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 162]
In an appeal concerning whether “ghee” is a “product of livestock” under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966, the division bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and SVN Bhatti, JJ. has held that there was nothing wrong in the 1994 notification and the challenge to the notification has rightly been turned down by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, stating that the notification is not under Section 3 but under Section 4 of the Act, and is valid and moreover “ghee” is a livestock product. [Sangam Milk Producer Co. Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 236]
In a civil appeal against Bombay High Court’s decision, whereby, the appellant- Sayunkta Sangarsh Samiti’s petition for quashing the Slum Rehabilitation Authority Maharashtra’s (SRA) order, wherein, the allotment of the rehabilitated towers of the slum was not in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) signed between the developer and the appellant society, was dismissed. The Division Bench of Aniruddha Bose and Sudhanshu Dhulia*, JJ., dismissed the appellant society’s appeal and directed the SRA to carry out the allotment of flats in accordance with law and not in terms of the MoU, being a private agreement.
“Slums of Mumbai are symbolic of the existing inequalities in our society. The growth of industries and urban centres invariably result in migration of rural population to urban industrial areas, in search of employment. The migrants, displaced poor and the marginalised are forced by circumstances to form a living space for themselves, which are called slums.”
[Sayunkta Sangarsh Samiti v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1684]
In twin appeals against judgment and order passed by Rajasthan High Court on 8-08-2007 acquitting all the accused persons for major offences under Sections 302, 307 but convicting for Sections 323, 324, 325, 447, 147/148 read with Section 149 of the IPC while also reducing their sentence to the period already undergone, the Division Bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Sudhanshu Dhulia*, JJ. did not concur with the High Court’s view discrediting evidence of deceased’s wife, who was also injured in the said incident. The Court held that the minor discrepancies in her statement made before the police and the cross examination could not be the reason for completely discrediting her evidence.
[Birbal Nath v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1396]
In a writ petition against the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, wherein the Court decided to not appoint the petitioner for the post of Judicial officer (Civil Judge, Junior Division) for Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services, as she has not disclosed that she had a criminal case under Section 289 of the Penal Code, 1860, against her, the division bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ. while quashing the impugned order, has said that the impugned order, though well intentioned, is causing grave injustice to the petitioner. Further, it directed that the petitioner should be appointed to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and that her seniority will be from the date of her selection, in order of her merit. However, she will be entitled to her salary only from the date of her joining the post….
[Apoorva Pathak v. Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1445]
In a criminal appeal against the order of Punjab and Haryana High Court, wherein the conviction and life sentence order under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) of the Trial Court to the accused/ convict was upheld by the High Court, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ., allowed the convict’s appeal and set aside the life sentence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) of the convict as the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 564]
In an appeal filed by a training institute (appellant) against the judgment and order of Madhya Pradesh High Court, wherein the appellant has challenged the Government policy dated 12-05-2022 (‘Admission Process and Guiding Principles 2022-2023’) on the ground that it was violative of Articles 14, 15 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, as the government had made 75% of the seats reserved for the residents of Madhya Pradesh which is not permissible in law, division bench of Dinesh Maheshwari and Sudhanshu Dhulia*, JJ. has held that though reservation in favour of residents is permissible, yet reservation to the extent of 75% of the total seats makes it a wholesale reservation, which has been held in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654 to be unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [Veena Vadini Teachers Training Institute v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 535]
In a case where a married couple, who after barely staying together as a couple for four years, have been living separately for the last 25 years, the bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and JB Pardiwala, JJ has held that in such cases where the marital relationship has broken down irretrievably, where there is a long separation and absence of cohabitation, with multiple Court cases between the parties; then continuation of such a ‘marriage’ would only mean giving sanction to cruelty which each is inflicting on the other.
While the Court noticed that Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage is not a ground for dissolution of marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but a marriage can be dissolved on the ground of cruelty, it further observed that,
“A marriage which has broken down irretrievably, in our opinion spells cruelty to both the parties, as in such a relationship each party is treating the other with cruelty. It is therefore a ground for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Act.”
[Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 497]
In an appeal challenging the order passed by Himachal Pradesh High Court, wherein the Court had dismissed the condonation of delay applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, declining to condone a delay of 254 days, because the reasons assigned for the condonation were not sufficient reasons for condonation of the delay, the division bench of PS Narasimha and Sudhanshu Dhulia*, JJ. held that the High Court was right in dismissing appellant’s application, as insufficient funds could not have been sufficient ground for condonation of delay, under the facts and circumstance of the case. [Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92]
The 3-judge bench of UU Lalit, CJ and S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia*, JJ has set aside the order of Jharkhand High Court, wherein the two PILs filed against Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren, were held to be maintainable and hence, it had decided to proceed in the case. The Supreme Court, however, was of the opinion that PILs were not filed with clean hands and hence, were not maintainable and were liable to be dismissed at the very threshold itself.
“It was not proper for the High Court to entertain a PIL which is based on mere allegations and half baked truth that too at the hands of a person who has not been able to fully satisfy his credentials and has come to the Court with unclean hands.”
[State of Jharkhand v. Shiv Shankar Sharma, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1541]
The Hijab Ban controversy in the State of Karnataka is far from coming to an end as the bench of Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ delivers a split verdict and refers the matter to a larger bench. Justice Dhulia stated that by asking the girls to take off their hijab before they enter the school gates, is first an invasion on their privacy, then it is an attack on their dignity, and then ultimately it is a denial to them of secular education. These are clearly violative of Article 19(1)(a), Article 21 and Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. Hence, there shall be no restriction on the wearing of hijab anywhere in schools and colleges in Karnataka.
“If she wants to wear hijab, even inside her class room, she cannot be stopped, if it is worn as a matter of her choice, as it may be the only way her conservative family will permit her to go to school, and in those cases, her hijab is her ticket to education.”
[Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 2 SCC 1]
In a special leave petition (‘SLP’) under Section 136 of the Constitution of India filed against the Judgment and Order of the Rajasthan High Court, wherein an appeal against the order of the Special Judge, POCSO, denying bail to the minor/accused was dismissed for offences under Sections 363, 366-A, 368, 376 of Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3, 4, 16 and 17 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Division Bench of A.S. Bopanna and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ., allowed the SLP and released the accused on bail. [V.K. (Juvenile) v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 841]
Taking Suo Motu cognizance of the matter where the Allahabad High Court had directed the Astrology Department of Lucknow University to determine if the alleged rape victim is a Mangalik, after the accused refused to marry her, the vacation bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Pankaj Mithal, JJ has stayed the said direction “in the interest of justice” [Gobind Rai v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 730]
In an appeal challenging the decision of Rajasthan High Court dated 25-04-2023 rejecting bail application of the petitioner for offences under Sections 366, 376, 384, 323, 328, 120-B of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’), the Division Bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ. granted bail to the accused considering three weighty factors favouring the petitioner, which also included a live-in relationship agreement with the prosecutrix. [Imamudin v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 782]
In a highly controversial extortion case of about Rs. 200 crores in Delhi’s Tihar jail, the 3-judge Bench of Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat, and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ., has directed conman Sukash Chandra to reveal names of the persons involved in the alleged crime syndicate. [Sukash Chandra Shekhar v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 894]
Adopting a humanitarian approach, the 3-judge Bench of Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat, and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ., allowed Project 39- A of the National Law University, Delhi, to have access to the appellant, a death row convict to interview him and conduct a psychological analysis in order to bring out mitigating circumstances. [Karan v. State of M.P., (2023) 5 SCC 504]
In a significant case, the 4-judges Bench comprising of Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat, P.S. Narasimha and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ., issued directions to all the High Courts of the country to submit reports indicating status of cases where bail has been granted by the Supreme Court i.e. if any of such persons are deprived of the opportunity of being released on bail for some reason or the other.
“… where the custody of a person for 9 years was found to be sufficient to entitle him to be released on bail, is now turned into custody for 11 years. This is nothing but reincarnation of Hussainara Khatoon [(1980) 1 SCC 81] & Motil Ram [(1978) 4 SCC 47].”
[Gopisetty Harikrishna v. State of A.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 654]
Dismissing the petition being devoid of merits, Sudhanshu Dhulia J., held that it cannot be any anybody’s case that a Government authority being Government school does not come under the definition of ‘public authority’. The only exception as to the information given under the Act under Section 8 of the RTI Act, is an exemption from disclosure of information. It further observed that the nature of information sought by respondent 8 is not covered under any of the exemption given under Section 8 of the RTI Act. [Jasmeet Kaur v. State of Uttarakhand, 2016 SCC OnLine Utt 2276]
The Division Bench comprising of Sudhanshu Dhulia, CJ, and Manash Ranjan Pathak, J., directed to connect CCTV cameras of Hospitals to the nearest Police Station to put a check on increasing instances of violence against medical practitioners amid Covid-19. [Asif Iqbal v. State of Assam, 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 1529]
The Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia, CJ., and Manash Ranjan Pathak, J., addressed a suo motu PIL concerning the plight of a rape victim, where the victim was a child between 12-15 years of age.
Observing the sensitivity of the matter, the Bench issued strict directions to the State to depute a team of medical officers, including a lady doctor to conduct medical examination on the victim, only for the determination of her age. The Bench emphasised strictly that the examination shall be limited to a bone ossification test and no other test be done as the victim had already been medically examined. [State of Arunachal Pradesh, In Re., 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 1553]
The Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia, CJ., and Manash Ranjan Pathak, J., addressed the issue of violence against doctors. The Bench ordered the State to ensure that no medical practitioner is manhandled or abused in any manner. [Suo Motu v. State of Assam, 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 1299]
The Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia, CJ. and Manash Ranjan Pathak, J., took up a petition filed in the nature of PIL; concern raised was the present condition of sex workers in Assam who, according to the petitioner in most cases, were on the verge of starvation, considering the strange and difficult times of the present COVID-19 pandemic, which is now in its second wave. [Debajit Gupta v. State of Assam, 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 1169]
The Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia, CJ., and Manash Ranjan Pathak, J., addressed the issues relating to situation under the Covid-19 pandemic in the Tea Gardens of Assam and conditioner of workers in these Tea Gardens.
“We have absolutely no doubt that since the Government already has the resources, these Mobile Medical Units must be put in use for testing and other purposes in the Tea Gardens as well, if not already being done.”
[Anjan Nagg v. Union 0f India, 2021 SCC OnLine Gau 1105]
The Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Alok Kumar Verma, JJ., dismissed a writ petition which was filed in the nature of certiorari and mandamus for quashing of certain orders passed by the enquiry officer and with a prayer to change the enquiry officer on grounds of bias. [Kanwar Amninder Singh v. High Court of Uttaranchal, 2020 SCC OnLine Utt 722]
A 3-judge bench of Ramesh Ranganathan CJ, Sudhanshu Dhulia and Alok Kumar Verma JJ, held that contractual state employees are also entitled to child care leave, and that its denial would mean the denial of the rights of a child. [Tanuja Tolia v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 SCC OnLine Utt 337]
A single-judge bench comprising of Sudhanshu Dhulia*, J., contemplated a petition presented before him by the petitioner who was a member of Waqf Board and was subsequently disqualified, aggrieved by which he filed the instant petition.
The Court observed that though the petitioner had a remedy under sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995 however, in this particular case the existence of an alternative remedy before the Tribunal not operated as a bar inasmuch as the present order had been passed without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. [Haji Rao Sharafat Ali v. State of Uttarakhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 893]
A Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Narayan Singh Dhanik*, JJ., contemplated the special appeals preferred against the judgment of Family Court, where the divorce petition was filed under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and was subsequently dismissed but the counterclaim of the wife-respondent for the right of residence was decreed in the favor of the respondent. [Raghuveer Kaintura v. Meera Kaintura, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 718]
A single-judge bench comprising of Sudhanshu Dhulia*, J., allowed the appeal filed by the appellants against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rudrapur in MACT Case No. 153 of 2013, whereby compensation of Rs 3,00,000 was awarded to the claimants. [Parwati Devi v. Paramjeet Singh, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 672]
A 3-judge bench of Ramesh Ranganathan* CJ and Sudhanshu Dhulia and Alok Singh, JJ., entertained a writ petition calling into question the exhaustiveness of Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. [Dhananjay Verma v. State of Uttrakhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 373]
A single-judge bench comprising of Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. stated that Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing (FEBS) under the Biodiversity Act, 2002, was welfare legislation that was made to cater the needs of the local and indigenous communities. [Divya Pharmacy v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Utt 1035]
A Division Bench comprising of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Rajiv Sharma, JJ., dismissed a contempt petition against a ‘Judge of a court of record’ purely on the question of law.
“The duty of a Judge, after all, was to dispense justice — without fear or favour, affection or ill will, without passion or prejudice. It is not a part of his duty to please litigants or keep lawyers in good humor. A Judge, ironically, with respect to the office he holds, does not enjoy much liberty and freedom. The principal requirement for all Judges, and particularly for a Judge of Court of Record, is to maintain his independence. A Judge can also be very helpless at times with respect to the position he holds hence for the sake of the independence of judiciary, a Judge has to be protected, from vexatious charges and malicious litigations.”
[Chhitij Kishore Sharma v. Justice Lok Pal Singh, CCP No. 03 of 2018, Order dated 04-09-2018]
A Division Bench comprising of U.C. Dhyani* and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ., dismissed a challenge against the appointment of State Chief Information Commissioner. The main challenge in the petition was that the office of the State Chief Information Commissioner has become the ‘dumping ground’ for retired bureaucrats, who are rewarded for their loyalty to the State Government. [Chandra Shekhar Kargeti v. State of Uttarakhand, 2018 SCC OnLine Utt 29]
Legacy
In his judicial career, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia made sure to uphold the constitutional principles through his judgments, whether at the High Courts or during his 3-year tenure at the Supreme Court. His decisions reveal his excellent grasp on law, determined dedication to uphold the law and firm stance against parties violating the law. His decisions, whether as a High Court Judge or Supreme Court Judge, reflect the wisdom that he has gained throughout his legal career. His decisions also reflect his determination to impart justice no matter what.
With Justice Dhulia finally hanging his Judge’s robes, there will be an undoubted void in the Court, but then one never really leaves the legal profession! It will hence be exciting as to what is in store for Justice Dhulia’s future; till then, we wish him a happy and relaxed retirement.
*Judge who has authored the judgment.