Supreme Court Weekly Digest July 21

Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 760

Anti Defection Laws – Speaker’s power under Tenth Schedule – Timelines for deciding disqualification petitions – Judicial Review of Speaker’s inaction – Petitions were filed alleging speaker’s inaction and delay in disqualification petitions – Supreme Court urges Parliament to revisit provisions allowing speakers to decide disqualification under Anti-defection law and recommended constituting a tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court or some other outside mechanism to ensure that disputes are decided swiftly- Held that speaker issued notice only after matters were filed or heard before Supreme Court, this inaction over 7 months was not considered “expeditious” – the original intent of entrusting disqualification proceedings to speaker was to ensure expeditious decisions, preventing matters from being dilly-dallied and tossed about in the Courts of law – Allowing such delays frustrates the very purpose of the Tenth Schedule and amounts to ‘playing fraud on democracy’ – Speaker’s failure to exercise jurisdiction by leaving the disqualification question undecided was considered a fundamental error warranting interference – Speaker while discharging functions under tenth schedule, acts as a Tribunal and his decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review – Scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226, 227 of the Constitution of India is confined only to jurisdictional errors i.e. infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity – It is justified in issuing directions to the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions within a specified period of time to uphold constitutional values and prevent anti-defection law from being rendered otiose by inaction. [Paras 33, 42, 50, 71, 72, 78, 91-94, 100] Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2025 INSC 912

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11 – Existence of Arbitration agreement – Interpretation of “May be sought through arbitration” – Held, a clause stating ‘redressal of the dispute may be sought through Arbitration and Conciliation Act”- does not constitute binding arbitration agreement – The use of “may be sought” implies an enabling clause that requires a further agreement between parties to resolve disputes through arbitration, rather than indicating a present and binding commitment to arbitrate. High Court had not exceeded the limits set by Section 11(6A) of the Act and had confined its inquiry to the existence of an arbitration agreement – Upheld order of High Court – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 23-26, 29-31] BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2025 INSC 874

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11 – Scope of Referral Court’s power – prima facie existence of arbitration agreement – Held, the reference court is not to conduct a mini trial or a laborious inquiry into existence or validity of the agreement – Rather Courts shall inspect or scrutinize documents to satisfy itself that an arbitration agreement as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act, prima facie exists – Burden of proving that prima facie arbitration agreement exists lies on the party seeking to rely on it. [Para 14-18] BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2025 INSC 874

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 2(4) – Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability – Works contract – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Withdrawal of Reference – Limitation – High Court refused to set aside the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Appellant and reaffirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of M.P. Arbitration Tribunal established under 1982 Act to adjudicate disputes arising from works contract involving State or its instrumentalities – Held, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private party if the dispute involves a public law element, rather than being confined to private contractual obligations, and the private party performs a public duty or is subject to a statutory obligation in relation to a state entity – In cases where a state owned entity-respondent files a writ petition to challenge the invocation of arbitration under 1996 Act due to existence of a statutory remedy under the 1983 Act, the issue pertains to the availability and exclusivity of a statutory dispute resolution mechanism, this involving a public law element, making the writ petition maintainable – Upheld order of High Court and directed appellant to file an application to recall withdrawal order and seek restoration of reference petition. [Para 8] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vs. 1983 Act – Held, disputes arising out of ‘work contract’ with MP Govt. instrumentality shall be referred to MP Arbitration Tribunal – Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act, preserves the operation of special statutory forums like the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, reinforcing its exclusivity – There is no repugnancy between the 1996 Act and the 1983 Act – a reference to a special tribunal under a special enactment survives, irrespective of the existence of a mechanism under the 1996 Act. [Para 10] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS, 2023) – Distinction between Court Summons and Investigating Agency Notices – Supreme Court distinguished between summons issued by a Court (under sections 63, 64 and 71 of BNSS, 2023) and notices issued by the Investigating Agency (under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023) – Held, Sections 63 & 64 allow for electronic service of court summons, particularly when they bear the image of the court’s seal and Section 71 explicitly permits electronic service for summons to witnesses – non-compliance of a witness summons under Section 71 has no immediate bearing on the liberty of an individual – A notice under section 35, issued by the Investigating Agency, is an executive act, whereas a court summons is a judicial act – The procedure for a judicial act cannot be read into an executive act. [Paras 38, 39] Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2025 INSC 909

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS, 2023) – Section 35 (Section 41A CrPC) – Service of notice – Electronic Communication – Safeguarding Liberty – Distinction between investigation and Judicial proceedings – Supreme Court dismissed an application seeking modification of its previous order and affirmed that notices issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023, cannot be served through electronic communication such as WhatsApp – Held, Police summons under Section 35 BNSS can’t be served electronically – The legislative intent of BNSS, 2023 consciously excludes investigations from procedures permissible through electronic means where an individual’s liberty is at stake – BNSS, 2023 while recognizing electronic communication in certain contexts (like court summons, production of documents and forwarding investigation reports to magistrates), consciously omits electronic service for notices under section 35 – Non-compliance with a section 35 notice can lead to arrest, thus affecting personal liberty – Section 35(6) seeks to secure Article 21 from encroachment – Hence, service of such notices must be carried out in a manner that protects fundamental right – Application dismissed. [Paras 24-30, 42-43] Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2025 INSC 909

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 – Rules 13 & 14 – Initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings – Respondent challenged charge-sheet being void as issued without approval of the appointing authority or disciplinary authority – High Court allowed Writ Petition filed by Respondent concluding that a charge memo under Rule 14, issued by an authority competent to inflict minor penalties and requires approval from authority competent to inflict major penalties -Held, an authority competent to impose minor penalties can issue a charge-sheet even for the imposition of major penalties under Rule 14 of the CCS CCA Rules, 1965 – This is permissible as per a plain reading of Rule 13(2) when read with Rule 14 and Appendix 3 of the Rules – Chargesheet was issued by General Manager, Telecommunications who is competent to impose minor penalties and is the competent authority for major penalties as per Appendix 3 of the CCS CCA Rules – The inquiry did not suffer from any procedural irregularity and the final order was passed by the competent disciplinary authority – Set aside order of High Court – Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-18] Union of India v. R. Shankarappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 750 : 2025 INSC 898

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) – Section 129(5) – Upon payment, proceedings are deemed to be concluded – Interpretation – “Deemed to be concluded” – the deeming fiction in Section 129(5) of the CGST Act, which states that “all proceedings shall be deemed to be concluded” upon payment of specified amount, does not absolve the proper officer from passing formal order – The term “conclusion” in this context merely signifies that no further proceedings for prosecution will be initiated, but it does not imply that the assesses has waived their right to challenge the levy or that adjudication is dispensed with – It becomes imperative for authorities to pass a speaking order justifying the demand of tax and penalty. [Paras 13, 17, 18] ASP Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2025 INSC 890

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) – Section 129 – Detention, seizure and release of goods in transit – Section 107 – Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 – Rule 142 – High Court dismissed appeal, holding that payment under Section 129(1) deemed the matter concluded under Section 129(5) – Held, even if tax and penalty are paid by an assesses following a notice of detention under section 129(3) of the CGST Act, the assesses cannot be held to waive the right to file a statutory appeal – Mere payment of penalty for the release of goods detained during transit under GST regime does not conclude proceedings unless a formal, reasoned order is passed under Section 129(3) of CGST Act – The proper officer is mandatorily required to pass a reasoned final order in Form GST MOV-09, upload its summary in Form GST DRC-07 – Every show-cause notice must culminate in a final, reasoned order to enable the taxpayer to avail statutory remedies under Section 107 of GST Act, 2017 – The failure to pass such an order frustrates the statutory right to appeal and violates Articles 265 of the Constitution. Set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Paras 9, 12, 15, 16.1, 19] ASP Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2025 INSC 890

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order VI Rule 4 – Fraud – Held, Judgement/decree obtained by fraud is a nullity – Fraud unravels everything – Fraud to be pleaded and proved – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts – A judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and not in existence in law – Such a decree whether from the first court or the highest court, is to be treated as a nullity by every court and can be challenged in any court, at any time, even in collateral proceedings, without necessarily being assailed in appeal, revision or writ proceedings – Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved and particulars of fraud must be stated in the pleadings as per Order VI Rule IV of CPC – Principle of finality of litigation cannot be extended to promote fraud – A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court and can be summarily dismissed at any stage. Set aside order of High Court citing fraud vitiated entire proceedings – Petition dismissed. [Paras 84, 85] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Custodial Violence – Mandatory FIR registration – Preliminary Enquiry – Appellant himself is a police constable against whom FIR was lodged and he alleges custodial torture – High Court dismissed Writ Petition filed by appellant (victim) seeking registration of the FIR against Police personnel; transfer of investigation to CBI and quashing of FIR filed against appellant – Held, registration of FIR is mandatory and under section 154 of CrPC when information disclosing a cognizable offence is received, no preliminary inquiry is permissible in this situation – That police have no discretion in the matter, especially in cases involving allegations of custodial violence against public servants – allowing preliminary inquiries would enable institutional cover-ups and defeat the purpose of criminal law – failure of Police authorities to register FIR despite clear disclosure of cognizable offences supported by medical evidence constitutes a direct violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 – Set aside order of High Court – Registration of FIR against the victim of custodial torture constitutes a classic example of institutional abuse and perversion of criminal justice machinery to shield the real perpetrators while victimizing the complainant. Set aside order of High Court and directed registration of FIR against police personnel and quashing of FIR registered against appellant – Appeals allowed. [Para 4.4, 10-14, 32, 33] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Amendment of Complaint – Whether a criminal court has the power to order an amendment to a complaint filed under Section 200 of CrPC after cognizance has been taken – Held, compliant can be amended at post-cognizance stage if no prejudice is caused to accused – Concept of alter / amendment is not alien to the law and amendments are not barred post-cognizance if they don’t change complaint’s nature or cause prejudice to the accused – The test of ‘prejudice to the accused’ is the cardinal factor that needs to be borne in mind – Amendment only with respect to product supply will not alter the nature and character of the complaint – Set aside order of High Court – Appeal allowed. [Paras 15 – 19] Bansal Milk Chilling Centre v. Rana Milk Food Private Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 743 : 2025 INSC 899

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Quashing of FIR and Criminal Proceedings – Supreme Court quashed an FIR and criminal proceedings against appellants under Sections 290, 341, 171F, 34 IPC and Police Act, citing that quashing is appropriate when allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence or disclose a cognizable offence – Held that FIR and chargesheet did not disclose the crucial ingredients for the offences alleged, such as common injury, danger or annoyance to the public, voluntary obstruction, undue influence or acts causing inconvenience on a road specified in the Police Act – Appellants were exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully and that no useful purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution – Bhajan Lal Test was applied – Court should quash those criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by continuation of a criminal prosecution – Quashed FIR and proceedings – Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 15, 18-20] Manchu Mohan Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 757 : 2025 INSC 916

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Exhaustion of remedy – Whether an application under section 156(3) of CrPC could have been filed without approaching the police authorities – Held, the informant must first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station under section 154 CrPC, and if refused, then the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC – Only after exhausting these remedies can the informant approach the Magistrate under section 156(3) CrPC – Magistrates ought not to ordinarily entertain such application directly, doing so is a “mere procedural irregularity” – therefore the order would not be “without jurisdiction” or “vitiated on this count” – Order merely set the criminal law in motion and caused no prejudice to the petitioner – The Magistrate’s satisfaction that a cognizable offence was disclosed, even if wrongly recorded, should not be interfered with by the higher courts in inherent powers – Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226/227 of Constitution are discretionary and not obligatory for minor procedural irregularities, especially when there is no miscarriage of justice – Upheld order of High Court refusing to quash the order – Petitions dismissed. [Paras 19-22 28-33, 41] Anurag Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2025 INSC 895

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156 – Held, failure to file affidavit with Section 156(3) CrPC plea is curable defect if done before Magistrate’s Order – Filing of affidavit was a mandatory requirement as per guidelines laid down in Priyanka Srivastava case as a measure to safeguard rights of citizenry and to restrict unjust criminal action and filing of vexatious applications to settle personal scores – Supreme Court laid down following points – i. Directions issued in Priyanka Srivastava case are mandatory and operate prospectively; ii. Non-filing of supporting affidavit is a curable defect. [Paras 45] S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2025 INSC 917

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 362 – Review -Held, High Court in its inherent jurisdiction cannot invoke to override the bar of review under Section 362 CrPC – High Courts, while exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC – The inherent power of the High Court to make orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice should be exercised having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time and restrictions imposed by section 362 CrPC. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17] M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 737 : 2025 INSC 888

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437, 438 – Grant of Regular Bail or Anticipatory Bail on undertaking to deposit amount – Cancellation of Bail – Held, a practice has emerged where High Courts and Trial Courts grant regular bail or anticipatory bail subject to the accused depositing a certain amount, often based on an undertaking or affidavit filed by the accused – Accused persons frequently renege on such undertakings after obtaining bail, which amounts to making a mockery of justice and abusing the process of law – Directed that Trial Courts and High Courts shall not grant regular bail or anticipatory bail based on an undertaking that the accused or their family members might finish to deposit a particular amount – The plea for bail must be decided strictly on the merits of the case and in accordance with law – This practice must be stopped as litigants are taking the courts “for a ride” and undermining the dignity and honour of the Court – In case if High Court intends to release an appellant on bail with a deposit condition, it should have first asked for the deposit within a specific period and only upon such deposit, the appellant could have released – Bail shouldn’t be granted solely based on any undertaking given by accused – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15- 27] Gajanan Dattatray Gore v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 756 : 2025 INSC 913

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of process of law – Supreme Court quashes criminal case against badminton players Lakshya Sen and Chirag Sen over alleged fabrication and falsification of birth records for age-restricted badminton tournaments – Held, the criminal proceedings were an abuse of process instigated by personal hostility and a desire to harass the appellants – Appellants date of birth were consistently recorded in statutory documents, none of which had been challenged, and that multiple authorities, including the Sports Authority of India (SAI) and Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), had previously examined and closed the age-fraud allegations against appellants – Compelling sports persons of national standing to endure a criminal trial without prima facie material would not serve justice – Summoning an accused in a criminal proceeding is a serious matter and should not be undertaken lightly – Set aside order of High Court – Appeals allowed. [Paras 19-23] Chirag Sen v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 747 : 2025 INSC 903

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Held, second quashing petition on grounds available earlier not maintainable – Principle of constructive res judicata applies to quashing petition under section 482 CrPC – The failure to raise a pertinent ground/plea which was tangibly available at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition cannot grant a right to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material – There is no straight jacket formula that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable, but its maintainability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case – However, the onus to show a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition is on the person filing it – If successive quashing petitions are allowed then that would enable abuse of process – Set aside order passed by High Court allowing second quashing petition and restored complaint – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11-13] M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 737 : 2025 INSC 888

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Simultaneous Civil and Criminal proceedings – Whether civil and criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the very same set of allegations against the same person – Held, there is no bar to simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings – If the element of criminality is there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case on the same facts – Fact that a civil remedy has already been availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground to quash an FIR – But In absence of element of criminality, if both civil and criminal cases are allowed to continue, it will definitely amount to abuse of process of Court – Criminal case to be quashed when civil case pending on same issue and criminality element is absent – Prima facie elements of above offences not present in FIR – Set aside order of High Court and Quashed FIR – Appeal allowed. [Para 42] S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2025 INSC 917

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 14, 170, 239A – Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (2014 Act) – Section 26 – Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 – Delimitation Act, 2002 – Delimitation of Constituencies – Increase in Assembly Seats – The petitioners challenged notifications issued by the Union of India which conducted a delimitation exercise for the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, increasing the number of seats in its legislative assembly, while excluding the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana – The Petitioners sought a direction to similarly increase the number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in terms of the applicable statutory provisions – Supreme Court dismissed the Petition, holding that the exclusion of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana from delimitation process was not arbitrary or discriminatory – the delimitation process is a legislative and executive function, if compelled such an exercise through judicial fiat, it would likely be construed as an interference in the policy-making prerogative of the Executive – Held that the constitutional mandate under Article 170(3) of the Constitution serves as a bar on any delimitation exercise concerning the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, or any other State. [Paras 15-22, 26-29] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 20 (1) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 6 – Held, retrospective application of enhanced punishment violates Article 20(1) – Amended provision of Section 6 of POCSO Act, which came into effect on August 16, 2019, could not be applied to the appellant’s case since the offence was committed on May 20, 2019 – Retrospective imposition of a harsher penalty is barred by Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence – Sentence of “imprisonment for life, meaning remainder of natural life” did not exist on the date of the incident under the unamended Section 6 – Maximum punishment then permissible was imprisonment for life in its conventional sense – Supreme Court upheld the conviction of appellant under section 6 of POCSO Act, and modified the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life as understood under unamended statute, and set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 9-12] Satauram Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2025 INSC 892

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – A writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable only if it discloses a violation or imminent threat of violation of a fundamental right – Generally, a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order – The validity of a law on the ground of legislative competence will not be decided in an Article 32 petition if the law does not, infact infringe any fundamental rights – Mere failure to apply a rule which ought to have been applied may not, by itself justify an invocation of powers under Article 32. Writ petition filed by Petitioner is not maintainable. [Paras 66-70, 80] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884

Constitution of India – Pecuniary Compensation – Violation of right to life under Article 21 – Held, pecuniary compensation is an appropriate right and effective remedy for infringement of fundamental rights caused by State officials and defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable – This compensation shall focus on compensatory element and serve as a balm to the victim, without prejudice to other remedies in civil or criminal law – Injuries caused to appellant during his illegal detention, complete mutilation of his genitalia, use of chili powder and electric shocks on his genitalia are shocking, leading to violation of Article 21 – Supreme Court directed State to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as compensation to appellant. [Para 34, 36, 37] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876

Contractual Terms v. Statutory Mandates – Contractual terms, such as an arbitration clause, cannot override statutory mandates – If a statute designates a specific forum for adjudication, parties cannot, by mutual agreement, confer jurisdiction on an alternate forum – therefore, a clause providing for private arbitration is void ab initio in the context of a works contract governed by the 1983 Act – Held, 1983 Act overrides the 1996 Act in this context. [Para 12.2] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907

Custodial Violence – Transfer of investigation to CBI – Conflict of interest – Held, transfer of investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary measure to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances, particularly when necessary to secure ends of justice, maintain public trust and protect fundamental rights – Cases wherein local police are accused of complicity or bias and a clear conflict of interest exists, entrusting the investigation to an independent agency like CBI becomes imperative – High Court erred in not directing a CBI investigation despite allegations of custodial torture. Set aside order and Appeals allowed. [Para 15, 17-19, 23] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Held that it is subject to constitutional limitations – it is a well-recognized principle, rooted in ideals of fairness, non-arbitrariness and transparency in executive action – It arises when a public authority, either through a consistent past practice, an express promise or a statutory policy, creates an expectation in the mind of an individual or class of persons that a certain course of action will be followed – It is not a rigid rule and must be conceded where a superseding public interest or a statutory or constitutional bar exists – Legitimate expectation may guide how discretionary powers are exercised, it cannot be invoked to compel an authority to act contrary to a binding legal or constitutional command – Section 26 of the 2014 Act, which provided for an increase in number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, is expressly “subject to” Article 170 of the Constitution – Article 170(3) of the constitution imposes a constitutional embargo on any readjustment of seats in State Legislative Assemblies until the publication of census data following the first census conducted after the year 2026 – The delimitation exercise in the UT of J & K is governed by Article 239A of Constitution, which applies to UT, and not by Article 170, which deals exclusively with State Legislatures – There is a clear of constitutional distinction between States and UT regarding delimitation, and the claim of parity is unsustainable – Petition dismissed. [Paras 32-37] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894

Doctrine of Merger – Exceptions – Fraud – Protection of third party rights – Held, when a judgment is obtained by excluding necessary parties or suppressing facts, doctrine of merger cannot shield it – The doctrine of merger dictates that when an order of an inferior forum is subjected to a remedy before a superior forum, the superior court’s order becomes the final, binding, and operative decree or order – This doctrine, though rooted in common law, is not of universal or unlimited application – Exceptions to the doctrine include cases where an order was obtained by fraud, rendering such an order vitiated, non-existent – The doctrine also does not apply when the higher court has not adjudicated the issues on merits, and the controversy between the parties has not been fully examined – Furthermore, the doctrine may not apply where the judgment prejudicially affects a third party who was deliberately excluded from the proceedings – In situations where applying the doctrine would defeat the interests and rights of other parties, especially in matters of public significance, prioritizing justice and fairness should prevail over an absolute insistence on finality – If a specific portion of the judgment is decided by Court then only operative part of an original judgement merges in the judgment of appellate forum and not the whole judgment – Restored case for fresh adjudication before High Court with all affected parties impleaded. [Paras 93-96,105,106, 110, 112, 113, 124] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (EC Act) – Sections 2(8), 3 – Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) – Sections 2(8), 51E – Interpretation of “accident arising out of and in the course of employment” – High Court reversed Commissioner’s order for compensation citing that accident of deceased-watchmen did not originate from his employment because it happened outside factory premises – Held, the phrase “accident arising out of and in the courts of his employment” as it appears in section 3 of EC Act, includes accidents that occur when an employee is travelling to or from their place of work – Introduction of Section 51E into the ESI Act in 2010, which explicitly states that an accident while commuting to work is “deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment”, provided a nexus between the accident and the employment is established – This interpretation is based on the principle that the EC Act and ESI Act are statutes in pari materia and serve the common goal of social security for employees – This amendment to be “clarificatory in character” and therefore, it has a retrospective effect – Both EC Act and ESI Act are beneficial legislations – Set aside order of High Court – Appeal allowed. [Paras 15, 16, 18, 23, 37, 39, 40, 44, 47, 55] Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2025 INSC 904

Environmental Law – Supreme Court expresses grave concerns over “unscientific construction” and “human greed” causing environmental devastation in Himachal Pradesh (HP) – Dismissed appellant’s plea against ‘Green Area’ notification and initiates suo motu PIL to address the broader environmental issues in State – Supreme Court expressed severe anguish over the extensive environmental damage and ecological imbalance in H.P., attributing to lack of proper planning – Held that situation in H.P. has “gone from bad to worse”, leading to serious natural calamities, including floods and landslides that have claimed hundreds of lives and destroyed thousands of properties – Emphasized that humans, not nature, are responsible for phenomena like continuous landslides, collapses buildings and road subsidence – Identified major causes of destruction as Hydro Power Projects, four lane roads, deforestation and multi-storey buildings, deforest and forest degradation, climate change and glacier retreat – Noted that uncontrolled tourism leads to traffic congestion waste generation, noise pollution, overuse of water resources and encroachment into ecologically sensitive areas – “Earning revenue is not everything” and “revenue cannot be earned at the cost of environment and ecology” and warned that if the current trend continues the entire Himachal Pradesh ‘may vanish in thin air from the map of the country’- Directed State to submit appropriate report detailing the steps taken on the concerns expressed by the Court. Pristine Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 759

Hindu Law – Partition – Family Settlement – Oral family settlement – Registered will – Where a will distributes properties in defines proportions among family members and an oral family settlement also distributes properties in almost the same properties and there is material to establish that the testator anticipated conflicts and divided properties to avoid them – Then the existence and persuasive nature of the oral family settlement can be countenanced – especially when supported by the fact of possession of the properties – Supreme Court upheld genuineness of will [Paras 9,10-12] Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2025 INSC 879

Hindu Law – Will – Registered Will – Proof of execution – Presumption of Genuineness – Burden of Proof – Held, a registered will carries a presumption of genuineness – The burden of proof to establish that a registered will was not executed as alleged or that suspicious circumstances render it doubtful, lies on the party disputing its existence. The genuineness of the registered will was beyond doubt – Set Aside order of High Court and restored order of Trial Court – Appeals allowed. [Para 9] Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2025 INSC 879

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 7 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 – Acknowledgement of debt – Article 137 of 1st schedule to Limitation Act – NCLAT dismissed application by appellant as time barred, holding that balance sheet did not name creditor and therefore did not qualify as acknowledgment of debt – Whether an entry in the balance sheet for F.Y. 2019-20 constituted a valid acknowledgment of debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in context of section 7 of IBC – Held, an acknowledgment must relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate jural relationship between parties with an intention to admit such relationship – Intention can be inferred by implication from the admission’s nature and surrounding circumstances can be considered – Entries in balance sheets, financial statements of previous years constitute a valid acknowledgement of debt – Even if the name of creditor is not mentioned, still the balance sheets can qualify as acknowledgements under section 18 and it extends period of limitation – Section 238A of IBC makes Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings under the Code with Article 137 governing 3 year limitation period from the date the right to apply accrues – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22, 33-38, 41] IL & FS Financial Services v. Adhunik Meghalaya Steels, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 753 : 2025 INSC 911

Judicial Review – It is not available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker and a ‘quia timet‘ action would not be permissible – Interference is generally not permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings – An exception is made for cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such action is likely to have grave, immediate, and irreversible repercussions and consequences. [Paras 34, 51, 80, 81].Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2025 INSC 912

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 – Compensation – Determination of market value – Use of sale exemplars – Reference Court disregarded the highest value sale deed without providing reasons – High Court affirmed this decision with contradictory findings – Held, when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, the highest of the exemplars, if it is a bone fide transaction, should be considered when determining compensation for compulsorily acquired land – Averaging of sale prices is only permissible when prices is only permissible when prices have a narrow bandwidth or have a “marginal bandwidth” or a “marginal variation” and not when the values are “markedly different” – The reference Court’s approach of overlooking the highest exemplar and averaging the remaining was impermissible – Supreme Court enhanced the compensation by applying a 20% deduction to the highest sale exemplar’s value, considering the larger area of acquired land compared to the exemplar plot and granted appellant’s all benefit of solatium and interest on enhanced compensation – Set aside order of High Court citing as erroneous – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22, 31, 33, 46-48] Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2025 INSC 900

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 – Acknowledgment of Liability – Whether an amount or liability more than the amount or liability acknowledged can be claimed under Section 18 – Appellant claimed entire suit claim and High Court in appeal granted benefit of Section 18 of the Act but limited the recovery to the acknowledged sum of Rs. 27,874/- (amount acknowledged by respondent) – Held, there must be an ‘acknowledgement of liability in respect of the property or right in question’ and even if such an acknowledgement is accompanied by refusal to pay, it would mean that the period of limitation would have to be computed from the time when such acknowledgment is signed – An acknowledgment extends limitation for the liability that was acknowledged, not for new, additional, or time-barred claims – The respondent asserted a lower contract value and acknowledged only a specific lesser amount, so extending the period of limitation for the entire suit claim of appellant did not arise – Upheld order of High Court – Appeal dismissed. Airen and Associates v. Sanmar Engineering Services Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 745

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (‘1983 Act’) – Rule 53(3)(b) – Withdrawal of Reference and bar on re-litigation – A party that withdraws a reference without permission contemplated under Rule 53(2) is barred from instituting a fresh reference on the same subject matter – Such a withdrawal amounts to an abandonment of claims, barring re-litigation before any forum, including private arbitration, irrespective of whether arbitration is under the 1983 Act or the 1996 Act. [Para 17] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 – Definition of ‘Dispute’ under 1983 Act – Section 2(1)(d)- defines dispute as a claim for ascertained or ascertainable money valued at Rs. 50,000 or more, relating to differences arising from the execution or non-execution of a works contract – Unascertained money claims fall within the definition of ‘dispute’ due to amendment post-Viva Highways Ltd. v. MPDRC 2017 SCC Online MP 1448, meaning the Tribunal has jurisdiction even if quantification occurs during adjudication. [Relied M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors (2018) 10 SCC 826; Paras 9, 11] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 – Section 2(1)(i) – ‘Works Contract’ – the term “works contract” as defined expressly includes concession agreements executed by the State or its instrumentalities, regardless of whether direct financial support from the State is involved – A concession agreement for the development of a State Highway / District Road falls squarely within this definition. [Para 10] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907

Motor Vehicle Accident Claim – Appellant, a 20-year-old student, suffered amputation of his left leg in a motor accident – Accident occurred when a car ahead suddenly applied brakes, causing appellant to collide with it and subsequently being run over by a bus – MACT awarded Rs. 91 lakhs initially, which was reduced to Rs. 73 lakhs due to 20% contributory negligence by appellant – High Court further reduced the compensation to Rs. 58 lakhs, while modifying the liability for negligence: car driver 40%, bus driver 30% and appellant 30% – Supreme Court modified High Court’s order and held that driver must give signal before stopping on Highway and awarded Rs. 91 lakhs compensation to victim who lost his leg in a motor accident, re-evaluating contributory negligence and notional income – Held that the appellant is 20% liable for contributory negligence (for not maintaining sufficient distance and driving without a valid license), the car driver 50% liable and the bus driver 30% liable – Supreme Court enhanced the notional monthly income from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- considering appellant’s future prospects as an engineering student – Applied a multiplier of 18 and 40% for future prospects – Attendant charges of Rs. 18 lakhs reinstated due to 100% functional disability and compensation for loss of marital prospects increased to Rs. 5 lakhs – Set aside order of High court and modified compensation. [Paras 8-11] S. Mohammed Hakkim v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 749 : 2025 INSC 905

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 420, 406 – Cheating – Criminal Breach of Trust – High Court refused to quash FIR against appellant – It is settled legal position that the same person cannot be simultaneously charged for offences punishable under section 406 and 420 IPC with regard to one particular transaction as the ingredients of both sections are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist. [Paras 37, 40] S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2025 INSC 917

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 498A – Cruelty – Supreme Court endorses safeguards laid down by the Allahabad High Court regarding establishment of the Family Welfare Committee (FWC) to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC in matrimonial disputes – The objective is to curb the increasing tendency among litigants to implicate the husband and his entire family through broad and sweeping allegations – Supreme Court noted that husband was jailed for 109 days and his father for 103 days as a result of wife filing serious offences against them and expressed concern over such cases of misuse and ordered appellant-wife to issue an unconditional public apology to respondent and his family over false cases filed against them – directed to follow guidelines laid down by Allahabad High Court regarding the constitution of Family Welfare Committees for safeguards regarding misuse of Section 498A IPC – Quashed criminal cases and ordered marriage as dissolved. Appeals allowed. [Para 20-21, 23] Shivangi Bansal v. Sahib Bansal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2025 INSC 883

Power to transfer an investigation to the CBI – Held, the power to transfer an investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary measure to be exercised sparingly and only in rare and exceptional circumstances, where there is compelling necessity to ensure fairness, preserve public confidence and protect fundamental rights – Such jurisdiction is invoked when State machinery appears ineffective, biased or complicit or where investigation is tainted by delay, irregularity, suppression of facts, or when complexity/inter-state ramifications necessitate a central agency – Set aside order of High Court and directed to transfer investigation to CBI. [Para 17, 19, 20, 24, 25] Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2025 INSC 893

Right to mental health – Held, mental health is an integral component of the right to life under Article 21 of Constitution- Guidelines for mental Health protection and suicide prevention – Supreme Court laid down immediate interim guidelines for mental health protection – i. noted “deepening crisis” of student suicides in the context of contemporary education, recognising it as a broader underlying generational societal issue; ii. All educational institutions shall adopt and implement a uniform mental health policy, drawing cues from UMMEED Draft Guidelines, Manodarpan initiative and National Suicide Prevention Strategy; iii. All educational institution with 100 or more enrolled students shall appoint at least 1 qualified counsellor, psychologist or social worker; iv. Written protocols should be established for immediate referrals; v. annual reports shall be prepared indicating number of wellness interventions and training session. [Paras 31, 35] Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2025 INSC 893

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC & ST Act) – Section 15A(3) – Notice to victim before bail application – Cancellation of bail – Respondent No. 2-Superintendent of women protection home was accused for immoral trafficking, sexual exploitation and assault of inmates by administering intoxicating medicines – High Court allowed bail application filed by Respondent No. 2 – Held, Supreme Court cancelled bail application of Respondent No. 2 citing that that allegations against Respondent No. 2 shake the conscience of the Court as she is the officer-in-charge turned “rogue” and sexually exploited helpless women – Releasing Respondent No. 2 on bail would adversely affect the trial due to the imminent possibility of witness intimidation – Supreme Court reiterated that courts must consider factors like the gravity of the offence, the role of the accused, the probability of witness tampering and the likelihood of obstructing proceedings when granting bail in serious offenses – Supreme Court expressed disappointment regarding reinstatement in service of Respondent No. 2, which shows her influence with the administration – Order granting bail could be quashed merely on ground of non-compliance with section 15A(3) of SC/ST Act, citing appellant-victim was not impleaded depriving her of the right to be heard – Set aside order passed by High Court – Appeal allowed. [Paras 12, 13, 20-25] X v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2025 INSC 877

SARFEASI Act – Section 13(2) – Held, Framework is binding on lending banks/secured creditors and an MSME borrower must assert its MSME status and claim the benefit the FRAMEWORK upon receiving a demand notice under section 13(2) of SARFEASI Act – Supreme Court interpreted Framework harmoniously with the SARFEASI Act stating that the leading bank/secured creditor is not prohibited from classifying a defaulting MSME’s account as NPA and issuing a demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFEASI Act without prior identification of incipient stress – If the borrower asserts in its response under Section 13(3-A) of the SARFAESI Act that it is an MSME and claims the benefit of the FRAMEWORK with supporting reasons and an affidavit, the lending bank/secured creditor would then be mandatorily bound to look into such claim, keeping further action under SARFAESI Act in abeyance – If the claim is found worthy, the bank must act according to the FRAMEWORK for the defaulting borrower’s revival and rehabilitation – The Petitioner did not claim the benefit of Framework after the demand notice under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued – Writ petition was presented at the stage of compliance with an order passed under section 14 of SARAESI Act – Petition dismissed. [Paras 5-9] Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution v. Board of Directors of NKGSB Co-op. Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2025 INSC 908

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Held, the framework “Identification by Banks or Creditors” comes first, it is immediately followed by “Identification by the Enterprise”- An MSME may voluntarily initiate proceedings under the FRAMEWORK if it reasonably apprehends business failure or inability to pay debts and accumulated losses equal half or more of its net worth – MSME’s obligation does not end there, an application must be verified by an affidavit, and upon receipt, the lending, bank/secured creditor is mandatorily bound to proceed under the Framework – Intention of Framework was not to obligate every lending bank/secured creditor to ascertain if a defaulting borrower is an MSME and is suffering from an inability to pay debts before classifying an account as NPA – Such interpretation would render sub paragraphs 2 & 3 of paragraph 1 of the Framework redundant. [Para 5] Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution v. Board of Directors of NKGSB Co-op. Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2025 INSC 908

Service Law – Retirement Age Extension – Held, excluding outside State experience to consider retirement age extension is arbitrary – Government’s notification extending the retirement age from 60 to 65 years was made inapplicable to the appellant citing that appellant did not satisfy 10 year continuous teaching condition in University located in West Bengal – Classifying employees based on past teaching experience from universities within or outside West Bengal, particularly at the verge of retirement after decades of service, lacked a discernible object and nexus – Such classification was deemed artificial, discriminatory and arbitrary, violating the equality norm – There was no material to demonstrate how an employee who had served the university for 14 years would be better qualified for extended service only if their past teaching experience was solely in the State of West Bengal – It is a classic case of a suspect classification and artificial classification intended to sub serve only parochial interests and nothing more – Such classifications lacking a legitimate state objective should be struck down – Order of High Court was set aside – Appeals allowed and granted Rs. 50,000/- as costs to appellant. [Paras 19-24, 27] Subha Prasad Nandi Majumdar v. State of West Bengal Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 754 : 2025 INSC 910

Tax Law – Direct Tax – International Taxation – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – Article 5 – Permanent Establishment (PE) – Strategic Oversight Services Agreement (SOSA) – Appellant is a company incorporated in Dubai and is a tax resident of UAE and is engaged in rendering consultancy services in the hotel sector – Held, Foreign Entity doing business through temporary premises in India liable to tax – Article 5(1) – Existence of a Permanent establishment (PE) is sufficient to attract tax liability for a foreign entity in India, even in the absence of exclusive possession of a fixed place of business – The appellant has a fixed place PE in India within the meaning of Article 5(1) of DTAA – The income received under the SOSA is attributable to such PE and is therefore taxable in India – That appellant’s role was not confined to mere policy formulation but conferred a continuing and enforceable right to implement policies and ensure compliance in all operational aspects of the hotel – The degree of control and supervision exercised by the appellant is beyond mere advisory role thereby qualifying as a PE for purposes of taxation under Indian Law – Hotel premises were effectively at the disposal of Hyatt-appellant due to its continuous and substantial control over key operational aspects of the hotel business, therefore exclusive ownership or physical possession is not a precondition for establishing a PE and even shared or temporary access to premises can constitute PE if the foreign entity conducts business through them – Supreme Court reiterated the two essential conditions essential for the existence of a fixed place of business PE- i. the place must be “at the disposal” of the enterprise and; ii. The business of the enterprise must be carried on through that place, along with the core attributes of stability, productivity and a degree of independence. Upheld order of High Court- Appeals dismissed. [Paras 8, 11-13, 17-22] Hyatt International Southwest Asia Ltd. v. Additional Director of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2025 INSC 891