Supreme Court While Dismissing Justice Yashwant Varma’s Plea
The Supreme Court while dismissing the Writ Petition of Allahabad High Court Judge-Justice Yashwant Varma, held that the in-house inquiry is not a removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional mechanism.
Justice Varma had challenged the in-house procedure and its outcome, including the recommendation forwarded by then Chief Justice of India (CJI) Sanjiv Khanna.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Still observed, “Notably, if the Parliament, despite strong indication of a Judge either having indulged in misbehaviour or suffering from incapacity, does not initiate any proceedings for removal, no proceeding in a judicial forum would perhaps lie for activating the Parliament to have such Judge removed from office. The power, competence, authority and jurisdiction of the Parliament to decide what is in the best interests of the nation is left untrammelled by the PROCEDURE; hence, it is fallacious to argue that the PROCEDURE is a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge.”
The Bench remarked that “report or no report”, “recommendation or no recommendation”, whatever is the case, the Parliament’s power to initiate proceedings for removal of a Judge for alleged misbehaviour or incapacity remains unfettered.
Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, Siddharth Luthra, Siddharth Aggarwal, and Jayant mehta represented the Petitioner.
Case Background
While the Petitioner was a Judge of the Delhi High Court, there was an incident of fire at a store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to him. On the date of the incident, the Petitioner was away from home. In the process of dousing the fire, certain burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered in the store-room. Such discovery gave rise to suspicion that the Petitioner may not have followed the universally accepted values of judicial life including those included in the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life dated October 31, 1997; consequently, his conduct fell for scrutiny. Without wasting time, the “In-house Procedure” devised by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated December, 1999 was set in motion.
The Delhi High Court’s Chief Justice vide letter sought a response from the Petitioner. In his response, he said that no cash was ever placed in the store-room by him or his family members and he strongly denounced the suggestion that the cash belonged to him or his family members. He also stated that the same must have been planted in the store-room to frame him. However, the Petitioner neither denied the incident of fire nor discovery of the burnt currency notes. Upon receipt of the response, the same was considered. In March this year, a three-member Committee was constituted by the CJI and a press release disclosed that the CJ of Delhi High Court was asked not to assign judicial work to the Petitioner. At or about the same time, presumably on the Orders of the CJI, certain documents/photographs/video footage linked to the fire incident and discovery of currency notes had been placed in the public domain.
Thereafter, the Collegium of the Supreme Court recommended the Petitioner’s repatriation to his parent High Court. It was recorded by the Committee that misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from his office. Hence, vide letter, the then CJI gave the Petitioner option to resign or to seek voluntary retirement, failing which the competent authorities would be intimated to initiate action for removal. The Petitioner expressed his inability but his prayers were not allowed. A further press release in May was issued, recording that in terms of the in-house procedure, the CJI had written to the President of India and Prime Minister (PM) and forwarded the Report of the Committee along with the Petitioner’s response. Due to such circumstances, the Petitioner approached the Apex Court.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, noted, “… it needs no emphasis that although the CJI is the head of the institution, he too is not above the law which is supreme; hence, utmost care has to be taken to ensure that any action of the CJI is not in deviation of the PROCEDURE which permits the in-house inquiry to be undertaken.”
The Court said that judicial officers in every rank, and more specifically, the Judges in the higher echelons of the Judiciary owe huge obligation to the people of this country and no Judge, either of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, being above the law, acting in the discharge of his judicial or administrative/non-judicial or official duties in a manner attracting a possible complaint of not abiding by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (widely regarded now as the Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts) has to be shunned.
“The Judges should, therefore, act cautiously and exercise their discretion wisely, to evade creation of a situation where initiating action becomes imperative. The judiciary in India is characterised by judicial independence; however, judicial independence signifies flexibility of judicial thought and the freedom to adjudicate without external and internal pressure, and not unfettered liberty to act as one might wish. Just as judicial independence is fundamental, so too is judicial accountability; compromising one compromises the other”it emphasised.
The Court, therefore, held that the nature of inquiry in this case is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final as well as not violative of any principle of natural justice.
“We had repeatedly asked Mr. Sibal as to why the Petitioner waited to invoke the writ jurisdiction. Why did the Petitioner not object to the photographs/video footage being uploaded? Should the Petitioner not have approached the Court earlier without submitting to the jurisdiction of the Committee? Once the Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction, is it not to be presumed that he did so expecting a favourable outcome and the writ petition came to be filed only when the outcome was not palatable to him? Having regard to the caution sounded in paragraph 37 of Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ (supra), was it not incumbent for the Petitioner to point out any perceived fault or flaw in the PROCEDURE before submitting to the jurisdiction of the COMMITTEE? In view of P.D. Dinakaran (1) (supra), does the Petitioner pass the test of acting bona fide?”asked the Court.
The Court added that the Petitioner can well be held disentitled to relief based on his tardy conduct but not, perhaps, on the ground of waiver. It further said that it was not open to the Petitioner to believe that the Court would have refused to entertain the Writ Petition had he approached earlier, which made him wait.
“Uploading of the photographs/video footage, according to the Petitioner, caused him immense harm. Not only did it lower his reputation, he was convicted in the public eye without even a preliminary inquiry. It could be so. However, what baffles us is the conduct of the Petitioner to acquiesce to such uploading, participate in the inquiry without demur, and to question such uploading only after the COMMITTEE submitted its report to the CJI recording that there was sufficient substance in the allegations. The argument of Mr. Sibal that such uploading has had the effect of vitiating the enquiry is untenable. Though uploading of incriminating evidence available against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a step which the PROCEDURE requires and while such uploading may not be considered to be proper, it is indeed a fait accompli. No benefit can be claimed because of such uploading of the incriminating evidence at this stage, once in a duly constituted inquiry findings have been recorded as regards the failures/omissions of the Petitioner to abide by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life”it observed.
Court’s Important Observations
The Court noted that a person who is or was a Judge is not immune from proceedings being initiated by the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court or any High Court or any other authority, as the case may be, under any law for the time being in force and the action that could lawfully be taken against anyone, who is or was a Judge, might be civil, criminal, departmental proceedings or otherwise; but, such an action, has to be at the instance of the named authority only if it is conferred with such authority by law.
“That the PROCEDURE has its roots in the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution admits of no doubt. Accordingly, we hold that ‘law for the time being in force’ in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Protection Act would include law laid down by this Court and that the term ‘otherwise’ read in conjunction with ‘such action’, appearing in the said sub-section, is wide enough to encompass measures that the PROCEDURE contemplates. … The contention that the PROCEDURE lacks legal sanction must, accordingly, fail”it added.
The Court also observed that even though there could be a case where good grounds for initiation of proceedings do exist, the Parliament may in its wisdom elect not to go ahead to initiate proceedings for removal and contrarily, even if it is reported by the Committee under the PROCEDURE that there exists any of the two situations and the CJI, accepting such report, does not make any recommendation, nothing prevents the Parliament to initiate proceedings for removal if for reasons aliunde it considers necessary so to do.
Conclusion
Moreover, the Court remarked, “Yet again, the in-house inquiry or its report forming part of the PROCEDURE in itself does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally ordained procedure. Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional mechanism. We reiterate that “a stitch in time saves nine.”
The Court said that if a complaint of misconduct committed by a Judge is received and if at an inquiry conducted under the PROCEDURE the allegations against such a Judge are found to have sufficient substance, he cannot claim any immunity – either by citing abrogation of his Fundamental Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment – that his conduct is not open to be commented upon by the Committee or even by the CJI.
“We see no reason to hold that para 5(b) of the PROCEDURE in any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional provision. … Thus, uploading of the photographs/video footage on the website of this Court cannot be viewed as a necessary requirement of the “In-house Procedure” and, thus, approved. But, then again, nothing really turns on the uploading of the photographs/video footage since the Petitioner, as observed above, did not have any grievance in relation thereto which is obvious from his failure to question such uploading at an appropriate time thereby allowing a situation to grow where the Court is faced with a fait accompli. Even in this writ petition, no relief is claimed in respect of such uploading”it further noted.
The Court also remarked that the office of the CJI is not to be regarded as a post office that the report should only be routed through the CJI without his observations.
“Notwithstanding that the recommendation of the CJI carries much weight, one has to realize that the intimation given by the CJI, under the PROCEDURE, is for the eyes of the President and the Prime Minister alone and not anyone else. … Even though a hearing ‘could have been given’, it cannot be equated with ‘should have been given’ in the absence of any such express obligation in the PROCEDURE. The contention, thus, fails to impress us”it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court dismissed the Writ Petition.
Cause Title- XXX v. The Union of India & Others (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 943)
Appearance:
Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, Siddharth Luthra, Siddharth Agagarwal, Jayant Mehta, Aor Vaibhav Niti, Advocates Stui Gujral, Manisha Singh, GEORGE Pothan Pothicote, Jayoti Singh, Anurag Jain, Keshav Saigal, Vishwajeet Singh, Prakarsh Kumar, and Tasnimul Hassan.