Water as Weapon: India’s Indus Gambit Post-Pahalgam

By Kumkum Chadha

One of India’s first major responses to the Pahalgam terror attack was to hit where it could hurt Pakistan the most—its water supply. By putting the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, India has signalled a marked shift from restraint to recalibrated aggression in its Pakistan policy.

The Treaty governs water-sharing of six rivers flowing from India into Pakistan. Technical clauses aside, the abeyance is widely seen as India’s way of “starving” Pakistan of water—or at least demonstrating its capacity to do so. It’s a potent symbol, but how effective is it in real terms? Can India really cut off water? Does it have the infrastructure or global backing? Or is this a symbolic deterrent in diplomatic guise?

Two seasoned voices—Dr Uttam Sinha, a leading authority on transboundary water issues, and Professor Anjal Prakash, who has worked extensively on water and climate change—offer contrasting perspectives on the move in a revealing video interview. While Dr Sinha sees the decision as a diplomatic signal, Professor Prakash calls for a more hardline approach, arguing it is time India treated water as a strategic weapon.

Dr Sinha’s stance is nuanced. He clarifies that India hasn’t revoked the Treaty—it has merely suspended certain functions. “We have not weaponized the Treaty,” he asserts. “We’ve used its own provisions—like stopping the exchange of water flow data and flushing dams—to delay implementation and create pressure. It’s more of a functional freeze than a legal abrogation.”

He emphasizes that the move is driven by strategic recalibration, not emotional retaliation. “The Pahalgam incident isn’t just an attack on Indian lives—it’s an assault on India’s sovereignty and secular fabric,” he says. “This step sends a clear message: India’s patience cannot be taken for granted any longer.”

Professor Prakash, on the other hand, doesn’t hesitate to call for “weaponization of water”. He believes India must leverage the Treaty to punish Pakistan for using terror as state policy. “The IWT is an unequal treaty. Jammu and Kashmir has long suffered from restricted access to its own water. It’s time to use water strategically—for India’s benefit and as leverage.”

He argues that Pakistan’s agriculture and energy sectors are highly dependent on Indus waters. “About 80 percent of its agriculture and 30 percent of its energy come from this basin. Disruptions—even temporary—can seriously affect their irrigation cycles and power generation. Water scarcity will hit their kharif crop, and it’s not alarmist to anticipate a power crisis either.”

Dr Sinha concurs on potential economic impact. “There will be ripples, especially during lean flow periods. But let’s remember—over 60 percent of the Indus catchment lies within Pakistan. So, the shock may not be immediate or absolute. Still, the future is now—and every procedural step we take has a cumulative impact.”

So is this just rhetoric? Can India actually stop the water flow? Experts agree: not yet. Both point to a lack of infrastructure. Professor Prakash notes, “We can’t block the Indus overnight. We don’t have the dams or diversions ready. But withholding flow data? That has immediate psychological and operational impact.”

Long-term plans include building infrastructure to store and divert water, possibly over the next 3-5 years. “It’s more realistic to build a series of smaller dams than a large one, especially given the seismic volatility of the region,” says Professor Prakash. Dr Sinha believes that while full control is difficult, India must start using its waters “more rationally” and to its own advantage—something long overdue.

Crucially, both experts agree on one thing: the Treaty must be renegotiated. India prefers bilateral talks; Pakistan, predictably, wants third-party mediation. The deadlock, as ever, continues.

Meanwhile, the abeyance functions as a warning bell—symbolic, strategic, and possibly transformative. It repositions water from a neutral resource to a contested lever of statecraft. And if not a death knell, it certainly rings a new alarm in the history of India-Pakistan ties. 

—The writer is an author, journalist and political commentator